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about some disorders. Using the case of depression, I will then
show what kind of problems evolutionary explanations of particular psychopathologies encounter. In conclusion, I will evaluate
where evolutionary thinking leaves us in regard to what I identify
as the main problems of our current nosologies. I’ll then argue
that the prospects of evolutionary psychiatry are not good.
1. INTRODUCTION

Université du Québec à Montréal

EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHIATRY AND NOSOLOGY:
PROSPECTS AND LIMITATIONS

ABSTRACT: In this paper, I explain why evolutionary psychiatry is not where the next revolution in psychiatry will come from.
I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will review some of the problems commonly attributed to current nosologies, more specifically
to the DSM. One of these problems is the lack of a clear and consensual definition of mental disorder; I will then examine specific
attempts to spell out such a definition that use the evolutionary
framework. One definition that deserves particular attention (for
a number of reasons that I will mention later), is one put forward
by Jerome Wakefield. Despite my sympathy for his position, I
must indicate a few reasons why I think his attempt might not
be able to resolve the problems related to current nosologies. I
suggest that it might be wiser for an evolutionary psychiatrist to
adopt the more integrative framework of “treatable conditions”
(Cosmides & Tooby 1999). As it is thought that an evolutionary approach can contribute to transforming the way we look at
mental disorders, I will provide the reader with a brief sketch
of the basic tenets of evolutionary psychology. The picture of
the architecture of the human mind that emerges from evolutionary psychology is thought by some to be the crucial backdrop to identifying specific mental disorders and distinguishing
them from normal conditions. I will also provide two examples
of how evolutionary thinking is supposed to change our thinking

This paper was originally a chapter prepared for a volume which unfortunately never got to be published. When I began writing this paper,
I was a post-doctoral student working under Stephen Stich, and was
attending one of his seminars about the philosophy of psychopathologies. Given that I had just finished a thesis about the philosophical
implications of evolutionary psychology, I was naturally drawn to evolutionary psychiatry.1 This rather new discipline (which has old roots,
for instance in the likes of Maudsley, James, and Freud2 ) proposed to
add to the focus on proximal (psychological) mechanisms of current
psychiatry, the consideration of evolutionary origins of those mechanisms. I was interested in evolutionary psychiatry not only because
I saw it as a natural extension of evolutionary psychology, but also
because it solved a problem which was dear to me at the time: the
problem of the unification of disciplines, especially the problem of the
unification of psychology. While teaching a philosophy of psychology
class, I became acquainted with the debate between partisans of unification of psychology (Staats 1987a,b, 1989, 1991) and partisans of the
disunification of psychology (Ermer et al. 2007b; Koch 1981; Kendler
1987). The debate never echoed much in philosophy of psychology,
but I thought the question of the importance of unification for psychology was interesting and worth pondering. One incarnation of this
problem that seemed to me of crucial importance—because, among
other things, of its practical consequences—was that which was encountered in psychiatry. Psychiatry, as many experts saw it, was badly
in need of unification. Solutions to the unification problem had been
tried before, but according to many the answer that had been adopted
had failed. Indeed, tired of internal wars between various theoretical factions (psychoanalysis, behaviorism, humanism, phenomenology,
etc.), the architects of the DSM had been looking for ways to increase
Vol. 7: Morality and the Cognitive Sciences
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unity within their field. The solution they hit upon was to attempt to
produce a nosology independent of particular etiological theories that
divided the field. As Wiggins and Schwartz put it, the problem was the
following:
Because no particular orientation or limited subgroup of
schools has established its credentials as the sole scientific
approach, there remains no scientific criterion for officially
adopting one orientation over the others (Schwartz and
Wiggins, 1988). Thus the field of psychiatry must somehow accommodate all of the divergent schools and yet arrive at a single classification scheme that all agree to use.
How then to reach agreement amid such unyielding disagreement? (1994, p. 91)
In brief (and to be elaborated on later in this article), the architects of the DSM adopted what can be called the “vacuum strategy
of unification”, trying to separate psychiatric observation from psychiatric theories: “The common classification scheme would consist of
categories whose meaning could be defined as far as possible through
direct observation” (idem, 91). The use of observation was thought to
protect categories from “infection” from theories and from its effects on
unification of the discipline. But, as many observed at the time, such
classification is in essence shallow, it evacuates “theoretical entities” as
well as etiological explanations by relying only on clinical phenomenology. I thought that the solution to the problem of unification was
elsewhere—namely in the adoption of an evolutionary point of view.
At the time, I thought that the adoption of an evolutionary psychology
point of view would provide the much-needed meta-theoretical framework to achieve the unification of psychiatry.
Ten years later, my views of evolutionary psychology and its potential for the unification of psychiatry have changed. I now see a
number of problems with this view (some of which I detail in recent
and forthcoming publications, for instance Faucher & Blanchette 2011;
Faucher in preparation a,i) and my hope in its potential for unification
has waned. In this paper, I will explain why evolutionary psychiatry
is no longer where I think the next revolution in psychiatry will come
from.

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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I will proceed as follows. Firstly, I will review some of the problems commonly attributed to current nosologies, more specifically to
the DSM. One of these problems is the lack of a clear and consensual
definition of mental disorder; I will then examine attempts to spell
out such a definition. One definition that deserves particular attention
(for a number of reasons that I will mention later), is one put forward
by Jerome Wakefield. Despite my sympathy for his position, I must
indicate a few reasons why I think his attempt might not be enough
to resolve the problems related to current nosologies. I suggest that
it might be better to place accounts like Wakefield’s into the larger
framework of “treatable conditions” (Cosmides & Tooby 1999). As it is
thought that an evolutionary approach can contribute to transforming
the way we look at mental disorders, I will provide the reader with a
brief sketch of the basic tenets of evolutionary psychology. The picture
of the architecture of the human mind that emerges from evolutionary
psychology is thought by some to be the crucial backdrop to identifying
specific mental disorders and distinguishing them from normal conditions. I will also provide two examples of how evolutionary thinking is
supposed to change our thinking about some disorders. In conclusion,
I will evaluate where evolutionary thinking leaves us in regard to what
I identify as the main problems of our current nosologies.
2. THE DSM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, better know
as the DSM, is one of the main classification manuals for mental disorders used by clinicians around the world.3 Having achieved an iconic
status, it is often referred to as the “bible of psychiatry”. The third
edition of the DSM (DSM-III, 1974) is considered as something of a
paradigm shift in psychiatric classification with its emphasis on descriptive diagnosis and provision of explicit criteria sets (Jensen et al. 1997,
p. 236). Further editions have stayed within the limits of the paradigm
set by the editors of the third edition. Many researchers, some of whom
are even members of the task force responsible for the new edition of
the DSM (for instance, Hyman 2011), think that DSM-V will not be
a significant departure from the vision embodied by the previous editions.

Vol. 7: Morality and the Cognitive Sciences
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Despite its practical success, the DSM has come under the fire numerous times for what are thought to be its conceptual flaws (see
for instance: Cooper 2005; Galatzer-Levy & Galatzer-Levy 2007; Hyman 2011; McHugh 2005; Spitzer & Wakefield 1999; Wakefield 1996,
1997a,b). Geoffrey Miller nicely summarized the current situation by
saying that because of tools like the DSM “psychiatry is a mess” (2011,
vi); as he sees it, “evolutionary psychiatry promised to bring order in
this chaos” (idem).
Let’s start by identifying some of the problems with current nosologies that the evolutionary approach might be able to solve (note that
this list isn’t intended to be exhaustive); presented below are four principle problems currently discussed in the literature:
(1) First is an acknowledged lack of a clear and widely accepted definition of “mental disorder”. As Widiger and Sankis noted in their
review of the issues and problems affecting adult psychopathology, “An ongoing concern that is fundamental to the science of
psychopathology is the absence of an established definition of
the construct of mental disorder.” (2000, p. 377; for a similar
judgment, see Jensen et al. 1997, p. 232). A few years later,
in their A Research Agenda for the DSM-V, Kupfer and his colleagues echoed Widiger and Sankis’ claim stating that “[d]espite
the difficulties involved, it is desirable that DSM-V should, if at
all possible, include a definition of mental disorder that can be
used as a criterion for assessing potential candidates for inclusion in the classification, and deletions from it” (2000, p. 3).
Allan Frances joins the proverbial choir, writing “When it comes
to defining the term mental disorder or figuring out which conditions qualify, we enter [a] world of shifting, ambiguous and idiosyncratic word usages. This is a fundamental weakness of our
field” (2010, p. 5). More recently, Kendler and colleagues (“Issues for DSM-V: DSM-V Should Include a Conceptual Issues Work
Group”, 2008) call for the formation of a work group devoted
to conceptual questions, primary among them, the question of
the definition of mental disorder. As Kupfer and colleagues remarked, the question is important because a definition of mental
illness is instrumental to determining which conditions should be
considered disorders and which are normal conditions. Cooper
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provides the example of hypomania which she thinks has been
wrongly listed as a condition by DSM’s own standards. She argues, “[h]ypomanic episodes are characterized by a mood that is
“unusually good, cheerful, or high ... the expansive quality of the
mood disturbance is characterized by enthusiasm for social, interpersonal, or occupational interactions” (APA, 1994, 336). Hypomanic episodes are distinguished from manic episodes in that
there is no, or little, impairment in the person’s social or occupational functioning, and there are no psychotic features. Quite
simply a hypomaniac episode is generally a great thing to experience. [...] I suggest that hypomania in and of itself should not be
considered to be a disease because it is not a bad thing to have”
(2002, p. 8–9).
(2) A related problem relates to the objectivity of mental illness. In
a paper where they tried to provide a definition for the DSM,
Spitzer and Endicott wrote that “[t]he initial impetus [for their
definition] grew out of the controversy as to whether or not
homosexuality, per se, should be deleted from the psychiatric
nomenclature” (1978, p. 15). This concern is still alive as Kupfer
and colleagues note that providing a definition for mental disorder “is important because of rising public concern about what is
sometimes seen as the progressive medicalization of all problem
behaviors and relationships” (2002, p. 3).
It is no secret that part of the motive for providing an adequate
definition of mental disorder is to counter the claims of the strong
anti-psychiatry movement that emerged in the 60’s (this is made
clear in Kendell where he argues against the idea that ‘what psychiatrists regard as mental illness are not illnesses at all’ [1975
305; see also Boorse 1975]). For instance, Thomas Szasz is notorious for having proposed that the notion of “mental illness”
is, as he put it, a “myth” (1960). What he had in mind was the
following: “If mental illnesses are diseases of the central nervous system (for example, paresis), then they are diseases of the
brain, not the mind; and if they are the names of (mis)behaviors
(for example, use of illegal drugs), then they are not diseases”
(1994, p. 35). According to Szasz, the concept of mental illness
is a metaphor that hides under its allure of objectivity, a norVol. 7: Morality and the Cognitive Sciences
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mative judgment about some kind of behavior: “The norm from
which deviation is measured whenever one speaks of a mental
illness is a psychosocial and ethical one.” (1960, p. 114). It
is hard not to side with Szasz when considering the history of
psychiatry, many mental “diseases” like “drapetomania”, “hysteria”, and “homosexuality”, were obviously social constructs hiding an agenda. Similarly, some argue that the same is true of
disorders like ADHD (Timimi & Taylor 2004); depression (Healy
1997) and post-traumatic stress disorder (Young 1997). The fact
that DSM-V is or has considered including binge eating, Internet addiction (Pies 2009), or hypersexuality to their catalogue of
disorders does not help to dissipate doubts.
Is Szasz’s diagnostic about mental illness correct? Should we
really abandon the notion of mental illness? Is it impossible to
introduce some form of objectivity into the concept? It goes without saying that this question is paramount, since it concerns the
foundation and legitimacy of the psychiatric enterprise.
(3) A third problem is the lack of an explicit (and scientific) image
of what constitutes the normal functioning of the mind or what
constitutes normality in our current nosologies. As Galitzer-Levy
and Galitzer-Levy put it: “Most medicine describes disorders as
deviations from normality. Psychiatry is unique in approaching pathology without a firm concept of normality and health”
(2007, p. 171). Yet, such an image of normal functioning is crucial to the establishment of diagnostics. For instance, Widiger
and Sankis note that “... the DSM-IV criteria set for major depressive disorder (APA 1994) excludes uncomplicated bereavement,
presumably because depressive reactions to the loss of a loved
one are normal (non pathological). However, DSM-IV makes
no exclusion for comparably uncomplicated reactions of sadness
to other major stressors, such as a terminal illness, divorce, or
loss of job” (2000, p. 378).4 The result in this case is overinclusiveness (or false positives): some cases that shouldn’t be
considered depression are treated as such (see Horwitz & Wakefield (2007) for a detailed argument about the over-inclusiveness
of the DSM concerning depression).

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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The problem of the lack of an image of normal functioning relates
to the problem of the alleged lack of objectivity of our nosologies.
A scientific image of the normal functioning of the mind would
not only guide psychiatrists in their treatment of patients, but
would also provide them with an objective standard by which to
judge what is normal and what is deviant.
(4) A fourth problem—probably the most often discussed—is identified by Poland, von Eckardt and Spaulding who maintain that
DSM “constitutes a faulty conceptualization of the domain of
psychopathology and [that it] interferes with optimal pursuit of
clinical and scientific purposes” (1994, p. 236; a similar point
is made by Coltheart & Langdon 1998) According to Poland et
al., the assumption behind the DSM’s categorization is that “it is
possible to individuate psychopathological conditions on the basis of directly observable clinical manifestations [...] the operationally defined categories within the DSM system are supposed
to be natural kinds with a characteristic causal structure [...]”
(idem, p. 240-1).5 But as Kendell and Jablensky put it: “... the
surface phenomena of psychiatric illness (i.e. the clustering of
symptoms, signs, course and outcome) provide no secure basis
for deciding whether a diagnostic class or rubric is valid in the
sense of delineating a specific, necessary and sufficient biological
mechanism” (2003, p. 7).
The problem that architects of the DSM-III had tried to solve was
the following: prior to the DSM-III, subjectivity in categorization
was the rule.6 Depending on who you were seeing (a psychoanalyst or a humanist) and where geographically you were seeing
them, you could end up with a different diagnosis (Bentall 2006,
p. 222); there was very little consistency. To solve this problem,
“Spitzer asked expert clinicians and investigators what features
they used to identify, rather than explain, the disorder they studied. He then picked those features that were observable, such
as hallucinations and delusions, and insisted they be so defined
that any psychiatrist could confidently recognize them. Finally,
he tested delineated features as diagnostic criteria in field trials
to uphold those criteria that helped psychiatrists make replicable diagnostic decisions” (McHugh 2005, p. 2526). In a nutshell,
Vol. 7: Morality and the Cognitive Sciences
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the solution to the problem of subjectivity was thus to jettison
a priori theories (like psychoanalysis) and “replace clinical impressions with operationalized indicators” (Nesse & Stein 2012,
p.1).

with the current classification. As Hyman puts it: “The open
question is whether different manifestations of a basic pathological process have been divided into multiple silos, creating artifactual comorbidity in certain circumstances” (2011, p.7).

McHugh illustrates the result of this “revolution in diagnostic”
with the following comparison: “Being appearance driven, it
is similar to a naturalist’s field guide with the advantages and
disadvantages of such. Just as Roger Tory Peterson’s A Field
Guide to the Birds distinguishes a prothonotory from a yellow- or
blue-winged warbler by the bird’s coloring, voice, and range, the
DSM distinguishes and then arranges mental disorders by their
appearance—on their shared phenomenological features” (2005,
p. 2526).

In short, the problem with the DSM approach is that it “... provides no representation of the underlying biological, psychological, or environmental processes that constitute the pathology of
a given mental disorder... [as a consequence it] will very likely
continue to classify within the same category individuals who exhibit superficial similarities but differ significantly on underlying
process” (Poland et al. 1994, p. 250).

The use of phenomenological features for diagnostic purposes
can be compared to determining the problems with a TV set using
only observable manifestations (Murphy & Stich 2000). Many
things can be responsible for the fact that nothing appears on the
screen: the bulb might be burned-out, the TV might be disconnected, etc. As in the case of the TV, there is no reason to believe
that it is possible to identify the natural kinds of psychopathology
only by taking into account directly observable symptoms at the
phenomenological level.
The problem is magnified by what has been called the “Chinese menu” method of diagnosis (Galatzer-Levy & Galatzer-Levy
2007, p. 163). The DSM-III’s authors listed common clusters of
findings, and stipulated that an individual suffers from a condition when a certain number of findings from each cluster were
present. For instance, “the DSM-IV diagnosis of major depression
requires that a patient have at least five of nine possible symptoms. In this scenario, it is possible for two patients to receive
the same diagnosis with only one symptom in common” (Miller
2010, p. 1437). Given the presence of polythetic criteria it comes
as no surprise that people diagnosed with the same disorder are
not similar at a biological level (I will return to this idea shortly).
Moreover, it appears that there is a high level of comorbidity
among DSM-IV diagnoses (individuals who qualify for one disorder also qualify for other disorders), which suggests problems
www.thebalticyearbook.org

Poland and colleagues (1994) suggest that an alternative nosology should be based on more intimate relationships with basic sciences
like the cognitive sciences, neuroscience, molecular biology, etc; their
view has found echoes in psychiatry, as most psychiatrists nowadays
believe that categories should be built on stronger ‘etiological’ foundations. For instance, Andreasen (1995) argues in favor of new validation
models (that Schaffner 2002 labeled “etiopathogenic validity”7 ). She
asserts: “New models of validation probe beneath such surface features
and seek to identify actual neural and genetic mechanisms. Because it
draws closer to actual causes, the second structural program of validation can give mental illnesses a powerful credibility” (162; for similar
statements, see McHugh 2005, p. 2527).8
Some have argued that evolutionary psychology could also contribute positively to the elaboration of a new and more accurate nosology (Abed 2000; Baron-Cohen 1997; Gangestad & Yeo 1997; Keller
2008a,b; Keller & Miller 2006; Kennair 2003; McGuire & Troisi 1998;
Nesse 2009; Nesse & Jackson 2011, 2006; Nesse & Stein 2012; Stein
2006; Stevens & Price 2000). The above-mentioned are generally not
claiming that evolutionary psychology will do the job by itself, as other
disciplines will doubtless play an important role in the elaboration of a
more accurate nosology. It is usually suggested that one of the major
contributions of the evolutionary framework to this enterprise is the
introduction of new ways of understanding conditions that go beyond
the simple disorder/non-disorder dichotomy. To sum up Cosmides and
Tooby, the Darwinian approach to mental disorders should transform
the way we conceptualize, investigate, and classify disorders (1999).
Vol. 7: Morality and the Cognitive Sciences
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In the following, I will evaluate how a psychiatry—informed by
evolutionary theories—could fare with our four major problems.
3. A CONCEPT OF MENTAL DISORDER

The potential for an evolutionary perspective to provide solutions to
problems (1) and (2) has been recognized early on in the debate with
anti-psychiatry. In the mid-seventies, two important contributions to
the debate made use of an evolutionary perspective, trying to spell out
a definition of mental disorder that would provide an objective basis
for the attribution of disorder. Both presented themselves as trying to
capture the professional medical use of the concept (they weren’t interested in capturing folk uses). Kendell (1975), following Scadding,
proposed understanding disorders in terms abnormal phenomena displayed by members of a species which put them at ‘biological disadvantage’ compared to those who do not exhibit that phenomena, where
biological disadvantage is to be understood in terms of reduction of
fertility or augmentation of mortality. Given that reduction of fertility
or augmentation of mortality is something that can be measured objectively, it is possible to establish on a factual basis who is and who isn’t
afflicted by a disorder. Hence, Kendell can confidently conclude his paper by saying that “we have adequate evidence that schizophrenia and
manic-depressive illness, and also some sexual disorders [homosexuality] and some forms of drug dependence, carry with them an intrinsic
biological disadvantage, and on these grounds are justifiably regarded
as illness” (1975, 314).
Similarly, Boorse (1975; 1976; 1977) defined disorder (he refers
to ‘disease’ in his work, but this makes no difference in the present
context) in terms of its biological consequences:
A disease is a type of internal state of the organism which:
(1) Interferes with the performance of some natural function—
i.e., some species-typical contribution to survival and
reproduction—characteristic of the organism’s age; and
(2) Is not simply in the nature of the species, i.e., is either atypical of the species or, if typical, mainly due
to environmental causes.(1976, 62-3)
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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To the extent that the typical functional organization of a species
is a biological fact, and that the goals of this organization are survival
and reproduction (1976, 84), establishing that an individual of a given
species suffers from a disorder is in principle something that can be
establish objectively. As Boorse put it, “if certain types of mental processes perform standard functions in human behaviour, it is hard to see
any obstacle to calling unnatural obstructions of these functions mental
diseases, exactly as in the physiological case” (1976, 64). The problem
for psychiatry then becomes, getting a clear view of normal psychological faculties: “[W]e cannot call it [an individual neurosis] unhealthy
until we know that the mind is not supposed to work that way [...]
any stronger vindication of current clinical categories would require a
detailed and well-confirmed theory of the functions of a normal human
mind” (1976, 71 and 76).
As we will later see, it is exactly this well-confirmed theory of the
function of a normal human mind that evolutionary psychology seeks
to provide. But before arriving there, let’s simply say that despite its
references to evolutionary biology, most people haven’t been satisfied
with these definitions. One problem probably comes from the fact that
this view doesn’t seem to exclude conditions that we (socially) do not
want to consider as disorders, such as homosexuality. It is also considered too sensitive to context (though this wasn’t seen as a problem
by advocates of this view), as the capacity to meet biological goals depends crucially on the environment where the organism is. Another
problem stems from the fact that these accounts seem to rest on an inadequate conception of biological function. For some people, the kind
of function used by psychiatry has to be defined in terms of natural
selection, not in terms of the actual capacity of an organism to meet its
biological goals.
A proposal that has attracted more attention than the previous two
belongs to Jerome Wakefield. Spitzer, one architect of the DSM-III, describes Wakefield’s analysis of the concept of mental disorder as “easily
the most often quoted and most provocative analysis of the concept
of mental disorder that exists today, defining simultaneously the concept as legitimate and providing a framework for ... the criticism of
the actual diagnostic standards as being too liberal” (2007, p. viii).
Elsewhere, he continues, adding that the “HD [harmful dysfunction]
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concept is a considerable advance over the DSM definition of mental disorder [...] [and it should therefore] be adopted by the DSM-V
and the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria revised after a careful HD analysis”
(1999, 432). So, what is this analysis which both legitimates DSM’s
concept and provides grounds for criticism?
In a series of papers, Jerome Wakefield (1992a; 1992b; 1999; 2000;
2007a) proposed a definition of the concept of “mental disorder” that
he hopes will provide psychiatry with an objective criterion for declaring a mental condition a pathology. His definition presents an explicitation of the intuitive concept of disorder used not only by health professionals, but also by the general public. He believes that we can
analyze the intuitive concept of “mental disorder” underlying the field
of abnormal psychology by saying that it is a “dysfunction” of a psychological mechanism9 that is judged “harmful”. This definition is a hybrid
account of disorder for it has both a purely scientific and factual component (the notion of dysfunction) and a value component (the notion
of harm). According to Wakefield, both of these components are jointly
necessary to capture our intuitive concept of mental illness (1992a, p.
374). Wakefield has little to say about the “value” component of his
definition;10 he is far more interested in the notion of dysfunction that,
he expects, will provide psychiatry the objective foundations it needs.
Although the notions of “function” and “dysfunction” or “malfunction” have been used in medicine and psychiatry for a long time, according to Wakefield, only the evolutionary theory can analyze these in
causal and scientific terms. Wakefield proposes understanding the previous uses of function as cases of what he calls “blackbox essentialism”.
This theory is an extension of Putnam’s theory of reference that asserts
that we use concepts on the basis of prototypes before the underlying
essence of what we refer to is scientifically discovered (e.g. the concept of “water” existed long before we finally discovered its underlying
essence). Wakefield’s idea is that the notion of function (and malfunction) used by Aristotle, Harvey and others has been based on certain
prototypical instances of “non-accidentally beneficial effects like sight
[in the case of the eyes] and on the idea that some common underlying
process must be responsible for such remarkable phenomena” (2000,
39). However, the process responsible for the phenomena was not
known until the advent of the Darwinian theory.

www.thebalticyearbook.org
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According to the evolutionary theory, the presence of certain traits
(including psychological mechanisms responsible for behaviors) is explained by the fact that these traits (or mechanisms) performed certain
functions in the organisms’ ancestors, the effects of which had been
beneficial enough for the organisms’ ancestors to preserve their species
through natural selection. The function for which a trait (or a mechanism) had been selected is what has been called in philosophical literature the “normal function”11 or “proper function” of that trait (or mechanism). In other words, the normal or proper function of mechanism X
is to do what it has been designed to do by natural selection. It follows
that there is a dysfunction or a malfunction when a trait (or a mechanism) is not able to accomplish its normal function. It must be noted
that, contrary to Kendell and Boorse, the notion of “normal function” is
independent of the current adaptivity of the trait (or the mechanism).
Thus, the fact that a trait (or mechanism) is maladaptive in a current
environment is not a sign of a dysfunction. For instance, according to
Wakefield (1999), the fact that we are not capable of breathing under
water is not an indication of a malfunction of the lungs, but of the
fact that they can’t perform their functions in certain environments for
which they have not been designed. It should also be noted that the
notion of function is independent of our values. For instance, imagine
that rape or infanticide have been found to have been selected and that
they were adaptive in certain cases in the history of our species. If such
were the case, we would have to judge the mechanisms responsible for
these behaviors as being in good working order, even if we abhor and
disvalue the behaviors they produce. The objectivity of the concept of
function would protect us from the abusive use of the determination of
mental illness denounced by Szasz.
4. THE USEFULNESS AND RELIABILITY OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Many criticisms have been voiced against Wakefield’s definition of mental disorder (see commentaries about Wakefiled’s theory in Abnormal
Psychology, 1999 and World Psychiatry, 2007). The criticism focused
on here concerns the fact that there is no a priori reason to suppose
that our folk concept of “disorder” is worth keeping.
As I see it, there are two problems with the folk concept of disorder.
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The first one is that it is not clear that the analysis of the folk concept
that Wakefield uses is the one that scientists are using, or that they
should be using for their purposes. The second, which was suggested
to me by Stephen Stich in a personal communication, is that it is not
clear that people are unwilling to categorize as “disorder” those mechanisms that no longer produce adaptive behaviors or mechanisms that
are otherwise in perfect working order, but that give rise to behaviors
that are not socially acceptable.12 Stich goes so far as to propose the
elimination of the concept of disorder because of conflicting intuitions
concerning what it applies to.
Regarding the first point, Roe & Murphy (2011) have argued that
“the systemic capacity view of biological function and dysfunction seems
better suited than the selectionist view to capture what bio-medical
scientists take themselves to be doing” (217). In their view, when
medicine (as well as disciplines interested in the functional organization of the mind, such as cognitive neurosciences) considers the function of a trait, it is usually not concerned with its evolutionary history,
but rather with its contribution to the overall functioning of the organism. For instance, researchers interested in our capacity to obey norms
will posit that two cerebral structures are involved: the dopaminergic
system and some lateral structures of the prefrontal cortex (Barbey &
Grafman 2010; Montague et al. 2004). This research may try to explain
how each structure contributes to the general capacity, but nowhere is
there speculation about evolutionary origins. Likewise, when attempting to explain problems (disorders) with obeying norms, such work
might refer to the fact that one or the other structure (or both) is (are)
not functioning properly, but again, evolutionary considerations play
no essential role in the explanation.
In terms of the second point, let me say a word about Wakefield’s
method of conceptual analysis. According to Wakefield: “[The] conceptual enterprise [conceptual analysis] is also an empirical enterprise
aimed at discovering a certain fact about the world, namely what conceptual criterion or definition in the heads of people in our linguistic
community ultimately determines and explains their judgments about
whatever conditions are mental disorders” (1997a, 257). Indeed, conceptual analysis contends that it can discover which definition people
entertain by proposing cases that are seen as falling under a version of
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a concept which counters one’s own intuitions about what should or
should not fall under said concept. If a version of the concept accords
with our intuition, it is then proposed that it is the concept that we entertain. Wakefield can thus maintain that: “the process of conceptual
analysis does not look empirical because one generally uses one’s own
intuitions about the clear cases rather than going out and collecting
data. However, this oddity results from the presupposition that one is
dealing with a culturally shared concept, and the confidence that one’s
clear intuitions about the application of the term are likely to be shared”
(idem; my emphasis).
But what are the grounds of that presupposition? Why should
we think that our intuitions are representative of other people’s intuitions? What are the grounds for supposing that people share a unique
concept? These questions call for a more rigorous kind of empirical
investigation of the concepts. Luckily, in recent years we have seen
the emergence of an alternative methodology to study folk intuitions:
experimental philosophy. As Knobe, one of the main proponents of
this method, puts it: “Experimental philosophy focuses on many of the
same types of intuitions that have long been at the center of philosophical study, but it examines those intuitions using the methods associated
with contemporary cognitive science—systematic experimentation and
statistical analysis” (2007, 81). Oddly enough, though authors of the
Research Agenda for DSM-V do not think that this will settle which concept of mental disorder should be used, they nonetheless propose it
as part of the research agenda to “[c]onduct surveys ... to elucidate
the concepts of disease or of mental illness or disorder used, explicitly
or implicitly, by psychiatrists, other physicians, clinical psychologists,
research workers, patients, health care providers, and members of different social and ethnic groups. This could be done either by exploring
the meaning they attribute to such terms or by asking them to decide
which of a list of contentious conditions they themselves regarded as
disease or mental disorders ...” (2002, 7).
Despite his professed use of conceptual analysis, Wakefield also
uses experimental philosophy methods (see Kirk et al. 1999; Wakefield
et al. 2002). I will not comment about his results here (see Faucher
in preparation b), but I will make two suggestions. The first consists
of the need to use the method of experimental philosophy not only to
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test lay people, but also different groups of health professionals, and to
perform these tests in different cultures. The following is an example
of the kind of test that could be used. We could ask subjects to read
the following statement “In ancestral environments, it was adaptive for
some children to move a lot and to have a very short span of attention
in order to be able to respond to ever-changing environmental conditions. These children are biologically identical to children presently
labeled as suffering from ADHD”. We would then ask them: “In the
present time, do you consider these children to be suffering from a
mental disorder?” We could also propose stories in which ADHD is
swapped out for pedophilia, depression or schizophrenia. If a group of
people see these adaptative conditions as mental disorders, this would
go against HD analysis, as per Wakefield: “The HD analysis implies that
such claims that disorders are naturally selected are not merely false
but incoherent. A disorder is a failure of function and thus cannot itself
be a function of a naturally selected trait, according to the HD analysis”
(2005, 895). We could also test people with statements that would test
the necessity of the history of selection for a functional trait, or the impact of particular environments on disorder judgments. For instance,
De Block (2008) proposes the following: “SAD [Seasonal Affective Disorder] is an adaptative pattern of responses that contributes to the
individual’s reproductive success in higher latitude regions (Davis and
Levitan, 2005). Let’s imagine a girl born in Sweden. Mild SAD was part
of her ancestors’ phenotype, but, due to minor mutations, here parents
lacked this ‘capacity’. Yet, new mutations have provided the girl with
mild SAD”. Then, we can ask the subjects: “Is her SAD functional?”
or “One winter, her SAD mechanism stops working. Is she suffering
from a disorder?” or “Before her new mutation, she moves to Africa
where she doesn’t need SAD. Does she have a disorder in Africa?”. I
don’t want to prejudge how different groups would reply to questions
like these, but it is possible to think that they will reply differently (or
perhaps in ways incompatible with HD analysis). The question then
becomes what should we do with HD? Should we still retain it as the
best way to explain mental disorder, even if it is not a concept shared
by all?
My second suggestion is also methodological. It follows a proposal
made by Colombo et al. (2003) in their “Evaluating the Influence of
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Implicit Models of Mental Disorder on Processes of Shared Decision
Making Within Community-Based Multidisciplinary Teams”. Their idea
is to try to tap into people’s implicit models of disorder, the one, they
hypothesize, which is more explanatory of people’s actions and decisions. As they suggest: “Asking people, whether professionals or users,
directly about mental disorders will elicit, mainly, their explicit views.
[...] if the linguistic-analytic insight [this is their view of concept attribution, a view inspired by Wittgenstein according to which meaning is use] is right, on the other hand, if such concepts use is a surer
guide to meaning than explicit definition, then [...] how they actually respond to [...] mental disorders, will be driven by their implicit
models of disorder” (Fulford & Colombo 2004, 136). To achieve their
goal, they supplied subjects with a vignette describing someone who
is suffering from schizophrenia. Instead of asking forced choices (“Is
he suffering from a mental disorder?”), they asked the subject about
possible etiologies, responsibility for actions, potential treatments, etc.
Then they code the answers according to six models of pathologies
they constructed (which are: the medical model, the social model, the
cognitive-behavioral model, the psycho-therapeutic model, the family
model and the conspiratorial model). This technique is supposed to
reveal the “implicit theory” of the subjects. What they found is that
psychiatrists and community nurses shared an implicit medical model
(where disorders are the result of brain dysfunction), but that social
workers are more likely to entertain the social model (where the causes
of the disorder are social). What their data reveals is that even in
groups where a model of disorder dominates, some members of the
same group are attracted to different models. Even worse, a more
recent study from Harland and colleagues (2009) shows that judgment concerning adequate models of explanation for a disorder varies
from disorder to disorder (they asked subjects about four conditions:
schizophrenia, major depressive disorder, antisocial personality disorder and generalized anxiety disorder).
In a nutshell, not only should we test the intuitions of various
groups of professional and laypeople (and different groups of laypeople, including patients, family care-givers, etc.), but we should also be
aware of the possibility of a split between our implicit and explicit conceptions of mental disorder. We should therefore use methods to tap
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into our implicit conceptions (for a survey of potential methodological
tools, see Nosek et al. 2011).
I do not want to prejudge the results of the studies of our intuitions that I have proposed, but I do think Stich might be quite right
in regards to the state of our intuitions about mental illness. I wonder
though, if we should accept his conclusion. I agree that our concept
of mental disorder might be different from that which Wakefield proposes. Instead of elimination, I would propose a split (similar to the
one proposed by Boorse in his papers) between the lay concept and
the professional concept of disorder. Following Rachel Cooper (2005),
I agree that our folk concept is a bit like the “weed” concept, i.e. a concept structured by our practical interests. We also need a professional
concept, one that researchers would use, a concept that might be different from the lay concept and that would study conditions that result
from the dysfunctions of psychological mechanisms, independently of
the fact that they generate distress or demand a “call for action” (as
Spitzer & Endicott (1978) put it). For practical purposes, I think that
what we need is to develop a clearer picture of what can go wrong
with the mind and what can cause the distress that leads people to
seek treatment or assistance from psychiatrists. In other words, I think
we should not focus our attention exclusively on the notion of mental
disorder as proposed by Wakefield.13 For that reason, I would rather
propose (following Cosmides & Tooby 1999), considering the notion
of disorder within a larger framework of treatable conditions, i.e. conditions that are judged harmful enough that they require treatment. I
propose that it would be good to abandon the lay concept of mental
disorder for one involving treatable conditions. Being told that your
distress is the product of a normally functioning mechanism provides
little comfort—similar to someone saying that your headache is the
result of a normal physiological mechanism. We should not deny treatment to people who desire it, or forgo research into conditions that are
thought to be “normal”. Therefore, we should be prepared to break
the link between medical treatment and the presence of disorder. As
Nettle puts it: “To accept these conditions as medical is to acknowledge
that psychiatric diagnosis is in fact based on values, such as the need
to reduce human suffering, rather than only on natural kinds of mental functions or dysfunctions. We can’t clearly tell when people’s mood
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systems are disordered, but we can clearly tell when they are having
life difficulties as a result of their mood” (2011, 212). Another reason
to adopt the lable “treatable condtion” will get clearer in section 9. At
the present moment, and maybe forever in certain cases, we have no
idea of the evolutionary history of some traits or mechanisms. What
should we do in the mean time? Note that, according to Wakefield
himself, ignorance of the evolutionary origins of a mechanism forces
one to rely on intuitions about its evolutionary functions. But, as he
would be the first to acknowledge, our inclinations have proved in the
past to be a poor guide to dysfunction, as the cases of masturbation
or lack of female orgasm illustrate. As he notes, the ignorance of facts
about the origins of the traits leaves the door open to norms and values
in the attribution of mental disorders. The label “treatable condition”
has the advantage of dissociating the question of factual knowledge of
evolutionary origins from the pressing needs of the individual or society.
In the remainder of this paper, I want to demonstrate why evolutionary psychiatry seems to be in a perfect position to explain treatable
conditions, and to study dysfunctions. In Sections 6 and 7, I will review some forms of treatable conditions (for more exhaustive reviews
see Cosmides & Tooby 1999; Nesse 1999). Prior to that, I want to
say a brief word about the link between psychiatry and evolutionary
psychology.
5. EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE IMAGE OF THE NORMALLY
FUNCTIONING MIND

As Boorse before him (see also Kennair 2003), Wakefield thinks it is
critical for the advancement of the field of mental health “to understand the nature of mental mechanisms” (1992a, 385). For Wakefield,
only evolutionary psychology will reveal our “human species-typical biological design” (Horwitz & Wakefield 2007, 38). Therefore, “... in the
long run, the DSM must be replaced by a more theoretical explanation
of mental mechanisms. Thus, the destiny of the professions of mental
health in regard to theoretical and scientific process in the comprehension of the etiology, the diagnostic and the treatment of mental disorder
might depend in a large part on progress in evolutionary psychology”
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(2005, 900).
Let me briefly summarize what Wakefield (and others) has in mind
when he speaks of ‘evolutionary psychology’. Evolutionary psychology, or EP for short, results from the meeting of evolutionary biology
and the cognitive sciences. Evolutionary psychologists see the mind as
“an information-processing description of a subset of physical activity
of the brain that implements organized computational activity” (Cosmides & Tooby 1999, 454). They see this computational activity as its
evolved function, that is, the mind’s function is “to regulate behavior
and the body adaptatively in response to informational input” (Tooby
& Cosmides 2005, 5). However this doesn’t distinguish EP from other
kinds of psychology influenced by the theory of evolution (such as Human Behavioral Ecology [“HBE”], Winterhalder & Smith 2000). What
distinguishes evolutionary psychology are the following three theses:
Thesis 1: Massive modularity of the mind. The first thesis concerns
the architecture of the mind. According to evolutionary psychologists,
the cognitive architecture of the mind is composed to a large extent of
what Chomsky has called “mental organs” or “modules”.14 The concept
of modules used by EP is not as strict as the one used by Fodor, who
treats them as more or less natural kinds (that is, he postulates they
have seven properties that more or less always co-occur; see Ermer
et al. 2007a, p. 153). For evolutionary psychologists, modularity refers
first and foremost to “functional specializations” or “evolved specializations” (Baron-Cohen 2007; Barrett & Kurzban 2006; Pinker 2005;
Tooby et al. 2005). Contrary to Fodor, the properties of modules cannot (and should not) be stipulated a priori, but should be discovered
through empirical work, because the properties that modules will instantiate depend on the problem they are to solve (see Sperber & Caton
1996, 170).
Again, contrary to Fodor who postulates the existence of a few modules (six or seven input systems and as many output systems with no
central modularity), advocates of EP posit what has been called a “massive modularity hypothesis”, according to which the mind is made of
hundreds and thousands of modules, some of which are central modules (Cosmides & Tooby 1995; see also Pinker who is not in favor of
a very massive modularity and says he’s content with “two dozen emotions and reasoning faculties” (2005, 16)). As mentioned earlier, one
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should beware of the fact that the modules that are postulated are not
Fodorian, but rather functional boxes specialized in the resolution of
evolutionary problems.
Thesis 2: Adaptationism. The process of natural selection has shaped
cognitive architecture. As Tooby and Cosmides express, mental modules have been “invented by natural selection during the species’ evolutionary history to produce adaptative ends in the species’ natural environment” (Tooby & Cosmides 2005, xiii). This does not mean that
all aspects of our actual cognitive architecture can be explained by the
fact that they have been selected for the accomplishment of a biological function—some traits can be by-products or vestiges or even new
uses of old structures (i.e., exaptations). The main thesis is that the
explanation of the presence of complex and well-adapted mechanisms
in an organism must invoke natural selection as a major factor.
Thesis 3: Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness. Modules have been
shaped to solve particular problems of our Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness. (EEA). As Tooby and Cosmides describe it, EEA for
a given adaptation is “the statistical composite of the enduring selection pressures” (2005, 22). This environment also contains clues that
can both help develop the adaption and be used to solve problems.
For this reason, EEA “refers jointly to the problems hunter-gatherers
had to solve and the conditions under which they solved them (including their developmental environment)” (idem). Note that “[b]ecause
adaptations evolved and assumed their modern form at different times
and because different aspects of the environment were relevant to the
design of each, the EEA for one adaptation may be somewhat different
from the EEA for another.” (idem). For instance, the EEA for trichromatic vision that reappeared in some non-human primates (Mollon
2000) is different from the EEA for a form of advanced cooperation
that is found only in certain groups of humans (Dubreuil 2010).
These pressures or problems and the cues used to solve them can
be regrouped into specific domains (reproduction, predatory behavior,
social interaction, poison avoidance, incest avoidance, etc.) each with
specific properties (a good acquaintance does not necessarily have the
same properties as a good meal or a good friend). Since many of the
properties that organisms need to access are not “visible” to them, these
modules exploit cues that co-vary (often enough) with properties in the
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EEA in order to produce adaptative behavior.
The picture of the mind offered by evolutionary psychology provides the backdrop against which the notion of mental disorder can be
understood. Since the goal of evolutionary psychology is to discover
the structure of the normal mind, it becomes the reverse of evolutionary psychiatry. Evolutionary psychology produces an image of what
proper or normal functions of the mechanisms are that constitute the
mind. These mechanisms are the same as those that go astray in mental
disorder, and that are the object of psychiatry.
Evolutionary psychology, as presented in this section, has a rather
narrow definition: “evolutionary psychology” refers to what is sometimes called the Santa Barbara school of evolutionary psychology. Yet
the term ‘evolutionary psychology’ can be used more widely to capture other forms of psychology informed by an evolutionary perspective (for instance human behavioral ecology, gene-culture co-evolution,
or memetics) and these forms could also contribute precious tools to
psychiatry. Human behavioral ecology, with its focus on “fitness maximization”15 and the effects of ecological and social factors on behavioral variability could be better used with a definition of mental illness
in terms of failure of adaptative behavior, such as is seen in Kendell
and Boorse. Gene-culture co-evolution (Richerson & Boyd 2004) with
its focus on the role of culture and social learning biases in human
adaptation, and on the concept of niche construction (Laland et al.
2001), could be useful in explaining how certain non-adaptative ideas
fixate in individuals (in certain crucial periods of development, ideas
concerning personal worth or the acceptable level of violence or a legitimate object of sexual fixation could be acquired and be the source of
problematic behaviours; for the latter, see Aronsson 2011) or how new
human-created conditions (for instance schooling and the lack of playtime it imposes on children) are causing mental disorder (for instance,
ADHD, Panksepp 2007). Finally, memetics with its focus on the spread
of certain ideas in a population could be useful in explaining certain
mental disorder epidemics (such as multiple personality disorders or
hysterical fugue; Hacking 1995 and 1998).
It is thus possible to imagine an evolutionary psychiatry that does
not rest on an evolutionary psychology understood narrowly (Gerrans
2007). At the moment, however, the four forms of evolutionary psy-

www.thebalticyearbook.org

Evolutionary Psychiatry and Nosology

24

chology should most likely be used together, to the extent that they are
not exclusive one to the other, to provide testable explanations of mental disorders. In what follows, I will focus exclusively on evolutionary
psychology understood narrowly, since it is the form of evolutionary
psychology most referred to by evolutionary psychiatrists.
6. TREATABLE CONDITIONS THAT ARE DYSFUNCTIONS

As mentioned earlier, many psychiatrists that are in favor of adopting
an evolutionary point of view find that it would be preferable to talk in
terms of treatable conditions. In this section and the next, two kinds
of treatable conditions will be discussed: some that are the result of
dysfunctions and some that are the result of functioning mechanisms
in proper order.
The first group of treatable conditions is the one resulting from
cognitive mechanism dysfunctions.16
(1) Simple Breakdown: The simplest kind of dysfunction is the breakdown of a module. Cognitive neuropsychiatry has provided multiple
examples of such breakdowns. One example is given by Frith (1992):
in his model, certain schizophrenia symptoms (control delusions and
“voices”) are a result of the failure of a monitor mechanism in charge
of distinguishing our actions from those of others. This mechanism’s
breakdown leaves the patients without knowledge that they are the
source of a movement or a thought leading them to think that someone else is controlling them, or that they are hearing voices.
Another case of breakdown involves the severing of a link between
modules, which can be used to explain Capgras’ delusion (Young 1994,
1996). Individuals suffering from Capgras’ syndrome have no problem recognizing people with whom they are familiar in terms of of
their physical attributes, however there is a feeling that something
is wrong—familiar people appear to be somehow changed. The sufferer may confabulate, believing that the people are not really their
friends, family members, or acquaintances, but exact replicas (Young
1994, 1996). According to current theories, this condition relies on
the fact that there are two pathways to the visual system, one affective
(feeling of familiarity) and the other cognitive (a template-matching
system). The cognitive system is working properly, so there is recogni-
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tion, while there is a breakdown of the affective system, so recognition
is not accompanied by the normal feeling of familiarity.
A prediction that is dependent on assumptions made about the architecture of the mind specific to evolutionary psychology, is the one
concerning cheaters. Cosmides and Tooby (Cosmides 1989; Cosmides
& Tooby 1992; Fiddick et al. 2000) have argued for years that we have
a module dedicated to detecting cheaters in social interactions, and
that this module is different (i.e., uses different cues) than the one
involved in precautionary reasoning. In a paper written with Valerie
Stone (Stone et al. 2002; for an extensive review on the subject see also
Cosmides & Tooby 2005a), they study a patient case that purportedly
demonstrates that social exchange reasoning can be dissociated from
reasoning about other domains. Such a case goes against assumptions
made by most theories of reasoning, according to which both forms of
reasoning are accomplished by a general-purpose mechanism.
In principle, evidence such as that found for social reasoning could
be looked for in mechanisms in domains as diverse as predator avoidance, mating, responses to landscape, kin recognition, parental investment, group living, etc. Evolutionary psychology could truly play an
important heuristic role in the discovery of new conditions by going beyond intuition and instinct-blindness (Cosmides & Tooby 1995). Note
that because people are in principle “blind” to instincts that allow humans to solve adaptative problems, and that these instincts are numerous, there is the possibility of the existence of many more disorders
than what we find now in the DSM.
Moreover, evolutionary psychology has its own concept of disorder:
if a mechanism does not perform its evolved function, it decreases the
organism’s fitness and therefore harms it (there is no place for value in
this concept, as you might notice)—though the harm may not be visible
from the organism’s perspective (or from the point of view of its pairs)
or in the short duration of its life. In the long run (over generations),
organisms with such mechanisms would decrease in frequency in the
population. The fact that the fitness of an individual with a mechanism
x is decreased by .02 might have dire effects in the long run, it might
be non-functional in a sense, but I doubt that this is the sense which is
of interest for actual patients or psychiatrists.
(2) Over or Under-responsiveness: Another kind of dysfunction is
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when the module is working, but not computing according to the criterion that constitutes its evolved function. Examples of such cases are
frequent in emotional disorders; for instance, it is possible that some
cases of chronic anxiety might result from an over-active response to
danger. It is also possible to think of cases of under-responsiveness,
for instance hypophobia. If the functional theory of emotion is true,
i.e. that emotions are adaptative responses to stimuli that represent an
adaptative problem in the EEA,17 a lack of response to fearful objects
should be as detrimental for the organism as, for example, a lack of
pain. It might be that cases such as these remained unnoticed because
they are not distressing per se, but if functional theory is correct, they
must impose a cost on those individuals who are subject to them. As
Nesse and Jackson put it: “no one comes to the clinic complaining of
too little anxiety or an inability to feel sad, but this is just an artifact of
our limited imagination and the absence of a scientific foundation for
the diagnosis of emotional disorders” (2011, 187).
One thing that these cases make clear is that some reference to a
theory concerning the normal function(s) of particular emotions and to
the context in which an emotion is aroused seems necessary to establish what is normal and what is abnormal. Indeed, an emotional state
should be classified as a disorder only if it is in excess or in deficit in
relation to the situation that triggered it. A useful comparison is pain, a
protective reaction to stimuli that are potentially damaging for the organism. Before making a diagnosis of chronic pain, one would usually
try to look for environmental factors (including physical conditions)
for which the pain response would be responsible. If no factors can be
found, one would conclude that there is a malfunctioning of the pain
mechanism. According to some researchers, current nosologies—DSM
included—do not pay enough attention to what constitutes a normal
reaction to environmental factors. For instance, Horwitz & Wakefield
(2007) criticize the DSM’s definition of major depression because of
its sole focus on the presence of symptoms, which does not consider
that sadness is a normal reaction in certain cases (except for bereavement, yet even this exclusion is hotly contested now, see for instance
the debate between Kendler et al. 2008 and Wakefield & First 2012).
(3) Balancing Selection and Pleiotropy: There are situations where
it is hard to understand how a dysfunction that seems so detrimental to
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individuals can still be so widespread. How can it resist selection pressures and remain in the gene pool? This situation has been referred to
as the ‘evolutionary paradox of severe mental disorders’ (Keller 2008a,
396; Keller & Miller 2006).
There are many explanations of the paradox, some of which make
reference to variation in the cumulative effects of mutation: “Mutations that degrade the brain’s performance differentiate everyone on a
panoply of behavioral dimensions, making some people slow at learning, others bad at remembering, others too anxious or not anxious
enough, and so forth. But some people inherit an especially high
‘load’ of mutations ... that disrupt particular neurodevelopmental pathways, increasing the risk of aberrant behaviors and psychiatric categorization” (Keller 2008a, 397; such departures from design are called
“developmental instability”, Gangestad & Yeo 1997, 104)). Another
cause of the presence of mental disorders is the coevolution between
pathogens and their hosts. As Gangestad and Yeo put it: “Perhaps the
most important changes introducing maladaptation are those caused
by the evolution of organisms that we are in conflict with. Parasites and
other pathogens continually, and rapidly, evolve to be better adapted
to their hosts” (1997, 104). Studies have shown that pathogens are
known risk factors for mental disorders: for instance, “several studies
have found that childhood Streptococcal infections are weakly associated with adult obsessive-compulsive disorder” (Keller 2008a, 398).
Similar suggestions have been made concerning prenatal exposure to
infection and schizophrenia (Brown et al. 2004). If mental disorder
risk is affected by either pathogens or an evolved defense against them
in the host, the continuous co-evolution between the two can maintain
genetic variations in mental disorder risks, and therefore escape the
elimination of bad allele by natural selection.
Some other factors explaining the persistence of risk alleles in the
population are balancing selection and pleiotropy (the latter a type of
balancing selection). As defined by Keller, ‘balancing selection’ “... occurs when natural selection actively maintains two or more equally fit
alleles at a gene ... Hetereozygote advantage—in which individuals
who are hetereozygote (Aa) at a gene have higher fitness than those
with either homozygote (AA or aa)—is a special case of this process”
(Keller 2008a, 397). For instance, the same genes that cause sickle-cell
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anemia in certain individuals also protect others from malaria. But as
Keller himself notes, evidence in favor of such an explanation for mental disorders is at the moment scarce. Another type of evidence consistent with the balancing-selection hypothesis would be finding that relatives of those with mental disorders have some sort of fitness advantage. This might suggest that low doses of risk alleles (typically found
in relatives) have positive effects that counterbalance their high-dose
negative effects. The most intriguing support for this notion comes
from studies demonstrating that schizotypy (a personality dimension,
whose extreme form may constitute schizophrenia) is higher among
highly creative individuals (Nettle & Clegg 2006). One interpretation
is that low doses of schizophrenia risk alleles increased creativity and
fitness in ancestral environments” (Keller 2008a, 398).
“‘Pleiotropy’ refers to the phenomenon in which a single locus affects two or more apparently unrelated phenotypic traits, and is often identified as a single mutation that affects two or more wild-type
traits” (Stearns 2010, 767).18 One explanation makes reference to the
fact that a gene or set of genes can control more than one phenotypic
trait, especially if one of the non-disordered phenotypes is highly adaptative. McGuire et al. (1997a) consider pleiotropy as the explanation
for manic-depressive illness, which has some periods of dysfunctionality, but “is often associated with superior intelligence and/or creative
capacities” (p. 265; see also Nesse 1999, p. 264). Further, ‘antagonistic pleiotropy’ might be useful in explaining late-developing mental
illness. That antagonistic pleiotropy may be useful in this regard has
been suggested by Williams (1957) and refers to the fact “... that genes
with antagonistic effects at different life stages could contribute to aging in a way that natural selection could not alter. That is, genes with
beneficial effects prior to reproduction but negative effects after reproduction would be favored by natural selection over those that increased
longevity but were less favorable to reproduction and survival to reproductive age” (Stearns 2010, 769). Conditions related to senescence,
like Alzheimers dementia, might also be explained with reference to
such a process.
(4) The Extreme Variant Phenomena: The distribution of a single
trait in a population goes from functional to dysfunctional; the very
same genes that lead an individual to be dysfunctional in one domain
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might lead another to exhibit superior functioning in a different domain. Recently, Baron-Cohen has used this explanation in his account
of some autism symptoms. Autistics are known to have impaired mindreading capacity (impaired folk psychology), but also pay exaggerated
attention to details, have strong obsessions, and islets of ability. Apparently, this impaired folk psychology goes together with superior
“folk physics” capacities (i.e. they perform better at the embedded
figure test, which consists of finding a hidden figure in a more complex
one). Family studies show that students in math/physics/engineering
are more likely to have a relative with autism than students in social
sciences, and epidemiological studies indicate that the ratio of occurrence of high-functioning autistism is biased towards males in a proportion of 9:1. In view of these studies, Baron-Cohen has hypothesized
that autism might be a form of “extreme male brain”. In his view: “...
if the male brain involves this combination of impaired folk psychology
and superior folk physics in a mild degree, in autism spectrum disorders this combination occurs to a more marked extent” (Baron-Cohen
2000, p. 1254).
(5) Modules Fail to Develop: The first task of an organism is to assemble itself; for that reason, some postulate the existence of what
Cosmides and Tooby call “developmental adaptations” (1999) or what
Segal called “diachronic modules” (1996). In order to function organisms must first construct an “implemental adaptation” or “synchronic
module” that characterizes the adult cognitive make-up, and then it
must calibrate it. Dysfunction can result from the absence of the development of a synchronic module per se, as in the case of autism
where it is postulated that the absence of a Theory of Mind Module
(ToMM) is caused by severe deficits in joint attention skills. Such skills
include pointing gestures, gaze-monitoring and showing gestures. Simon Baron-Cohen (1997) attributes this lack of joint attention skills to
the breakdown of a part of the Mind-Reading System, more precisely,
of the “Share Attention Mechanism”. The absence of output from that
mechanism results in the lack of development of a ToMM that depends
on that output for its development. Dysfunctions can also result from a
miscalibration of a mechanism due to its exposure to an atypical environment. Cosmides and Tooby offer an example of such a phenomena:
“[...] violent treatment in childhood increases the likelihood that a
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person has been born into a social environment where violence is an
important avenue of social instrumentality. Therefore, the threshold of
activation of one’s mental organs should be lowered, so one is prepared
to act in and cope with such a world. The observation that abused children are disproportionately aggressive when they become adults may
be accounted for by a mechanism of this kind” (1999, 461; for the idea
of periconceptual, fetal and infant programming, see also Stein 2006,
769 and Meaney & Szyf 2005 for a spectacular example in rats).
7. TREATABLE CONDITIONS THAT ARE NOT THE RESULT OF A
DYSFUNCTION

There are also conditions thought to require treatment even if they do
not result from any dysfunctions. They are usually considered appropriate for treatment because they either interfer with the well-being of
the individual, or because they produce socially unacceptable behaviors.
(1) Evolved defense: ‘Evolved defenses cases’ are sometimes confused
with dysfunctions because they may cause pain or discomfort. However pain and discomfort are not good cues of what is dysfunctional
and what is not. Cosmides and Tooby mention the case of excessive sexual jealousy as a case of an evolved defense for which people sometimes
seek help:
Jealousy mechanisms often cause the mates that bear them
enormous suffering, and often motivate coercive, violent,
or even deadly actions toward women ... Yet jealousy is
solely for the “benefit” or fitness-enhancement of the genes
underlying the jealousy mechanism, not the individual who
bears them, and its function is to cause patterned behaviors
that spread those genes and retard the spread of competitive alleles. ... Using intuitive notions of well-being as the
standard, many therapists regard jealousy as a pathology
(by which they mean it is disvalued and potentially treatable condition), but to call this a disorder is to confuse the
values of the patients involved (or psychiatrists) with the
functional integrity of the cognitive adaptations that generate jealousy. (1999, p. 458)
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I’ll return to this notion in Section 8.2, using “normal depression” as
another possible example of an evolved defense.
(2) Environmental Mismatch: Conditions might emerge in cases
where a cognitive mechanism in otherwise perfect working order, has
to perform its function in an environment that is completely different
from that in which it has been selected to work (especially in new environments where the cues that once indicated fitness benefits no longer
indicate them). Nesse and Berrige refer to drug abuse as examples of
such cases: “Drugs of abuse create a signal in the brain that indicates,
falsely, the arrival of a huge fitness benefit. ... We are vulnerable to
such fitness-decreasing incentives because our brains are not designed
to cope with ready access to pure drugs...” (Nesse & Berridge 1997a).
If drug abuse is a case of environmental mismatch, individual variations in susceptibility to drug addiction are better understood as quirks
instead of as defects because they probably had no deleterious effects
in ancestral environments, they only appear in modern environments
where drugs are more easily accessible.
8. HOW THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH MODIFIES THE WAY TO
CONCEIVE OF SOME TREATABLE CONDITIONS

In this section, I would like to examine two examples of conditions
that are generally thought of as the result of a single kind of etiology.
I will suggest that the evolutionary approach provides reasons to think
that these conditions—while displaying similarity at the clinical phenomenology level—are indeed the result of multiple causes. The two
examples I will discuss are also useful in that they further our list of
conditions that arise from non-dysfunctional mechanisms.
8.1.

The Case of Psychopathy

John Blair (1995) suggested that humans possess a mechanism that
mediates the suppression of aggression in the context of distress cues,
and named this mechanism “Violence Inhibitor Mechanism” (VIM).
Blair explained that the mechanism plays a crucial role in the explanation of psychopathy. Despite what has been hypothesized before, he
postulates that the problem of psychopaths has nothing to do with their
capacity to read another’s mind, their problem is not that they don’t
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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perceive the pain their behaviors are producing in others. The fact that
they are so good at manipulating others is anecdotal evidence against
their mind-blindness. Blair (1995) has shown that despite the fact that
autistics have enormous difficulty reading other’s minds, they still develop moral emotions and the so-called moral/conventional distinction
(a distinction that adults and children are argued to spontaneously
make between different kinds of transgressions) that psychopaths are
unable to develop. For that reason, Blair believes that the core symptoms of psychopathy (absence of guilt and remorse, lack of empathy,
no inhibition of violent action) should be explainable by the breakdown
of the VIM (in addition to some impairments in executive functioning.
This clause would allow for undetected psychopaths who don’t end up
committing violent crimes, but who might nonetheless behave unusually. This subgroup would be constituted of psychopaths suffering from
a VIM breakdown, but without impairments in executive functioning).
Blair’s account suggests that psychopathy is the harmful (for others
at least!) result of the malfunction of a mechanism, thus it is a disorder by Wakefield’s criteria. Yet this account is contested by some researchers who, by the same token, react against the idea of a monomorphic mind, i.e. the idea that cognitive architecture is the same in every
normal human being. This group proposes instead the image of a polymorphic mind, i.e. the idea that there exists more than one “normal”
cognitive architecture. In this context, they ask if psychopathy could
not be considered an adaptation rather than a disorder.
Linda Mealey (1995) has suggested that psychopaths are the “product of evolutionary pressures which, [...], lead some individuals to pursue a life strategy of manipulative and predatory social interactions” (p.
135). The existence of such individuals is inferred from game theoretic
models which predict that this strategy is to be expected with very low
frequency in a population of discriminative reciprocal altruists, because
continually checking for cheaters is too costly. Ergo there would be a
niche for that kind of individual (a psychopathic individual), which
would explain the maintenance of the trait across generations. If this
is right, the trait would thus be frequency-dependent (a type of balancing selection we talked about earlier, Keller 2008b, 3); psychopathy
would be the result of a normally functioning mind. Mealey does not
stop there; she posits that if a subgroup of those whom we call psy-
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chopaths are what they are as a result of their genetic makeup, another
subgroup of psychopaths are what they are in response to certain environmental conditions during their development. These environmental cues lead them to pursue a life strategy similar to those who are
“born” psychopaths. She therefore introduces a distinction between
primary psychopaths and secondary psychopaths. In a nutshell, her hypothesis is that there are many different causal pathways that might
lead to a similar phenotype (psychopathy) and that the consideration
and knowledge of these particular pathways is of a crucial importance
in determining the type of action to be taken to help those diagnosed
with psychopathy (secondary psychopaths can react to cues of distress
for instance).
8.2.

The Case of Depressive Disorders

As Kennair (2003) noted in a review of the field of evolutionary psychiatry, “The disorder that has received most attention recently from
an evolutionary perspective is depression: most of the key researchers
within EPP [evolutionary psychopathology] are involved in the study
of this disorder. Within the review period covered here, papers on depression stand out as most ground-breaking and probably provocative
...” (693). Though seven years have passed since this statement, I believe it is still accurate. In the last several years there has been a flurry
of papers about depression from some of the main advocates of evolutionary psychiatry (Allen & Badcock 2006; Andrews & Thomson Jr
2009; Gilbert 2006; Keller & Miller 2006; Nesse 2009; Nettle 2004;
Sloman 2008; Stein 2006). In what follows, I will focus my attention
on two recent papers: Nesse (2009) “Explaining Depression: Neuroscience is not Enough, Evolution is Essential” and Andrews & Thomson Jr (2009) “The Bright Side of Being Blue: Depression as an Adaptation for Analysing Complex Problems”. Despite sharing the common
framework of evolutionary theory, evolutionary psychiatrists who try to
explain depression can be divided by the positions they take as to the
adaptative character of depression, and the evolved domain of mechanisms involved in depression. More precisely, the evolutionary explanation of depression can be divided in two camps: one camp holds
that depression is dysfunctional and that its domain is non-essentially
social; the other one holds that depression is functional and that its
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domain is social. Though each camp has many representatives, for the
sake of space, I’ll focus on only two of them.
In his “Explaining Depression: Neuroscience is not enough, evolution is essential” (2009), Nesse argues that “... serious depression is not
an adaptation shaped by natural selection. It has no evolutionary explanation. However, we do need an evolutionary explanation for why
natural selection left us so vulnerable to a disease as common and devastating as depression. Some abnormal depression is related to normal
low mood, so explaining the origins and functions of mood is an essential foundation for understanding depression” (21). Thus, an evolutionary perspective does not commit one to supposing that depression
is an adaptation, but it highlights the necessity of explaining why we
are vulnerable to it. It also grounds its explanation in the dysfunction
of an otherwise functional mechanism, a mechanism in charge of what
Nesse calls “low mood”. Since low mood is crucial in the explanation
of depression, let’s say a few words about it.
Nesse’s theory of mood is based on a functional theory of moods
and emotions. Nesse asserts that (for a statement of his position, see
Nesse 1990 and more recently Nesse 2009) emotions and moods are
organized adaptative responses to recurrent problems of our ancestral
environment. As he puts it: “Mood regulates patterns of resource investment as a function of propitiousness” (2009, 24). Negative emotions and moods are responses to situations of threat, loss, or situations where costs and risks are greater than benefits. More precisely,
low mood would be elicited by cues indicating a loss of resources of
adaptative significance: “The losses that cause sadness are losses of reproductive resources... A loss signals that you may have been doing
something maladaptive” (Nesse & Berridge 1997a, p. 9). The type
of losses that cause low mood can be “somatic resources (personal
health, attractiveness and ability, and material resources), reproductive resources (a mate and offspring), and social resources (allies and
status” (Nesse 2009, p. 27). So, low mood can be triggered by the
sudden loss of your pension fund, parental death, the loss of a loved
one after a departure or a breakup, the loss of friend after a fight,
the loss of social status, etc. The pattern of behavior characteristic of
low mood reinforces the idea that it has an adaptative function. Following Klinger’s (1975) seminal work, Nesse proposes that low mood
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functions in two steps: “When efforts to reach a goal are failing, low
mood motivates pulling back to conserve resources and reconsider options. If conditions do not improve and no other strategy is viable, low
mood disengages motivation from the unreachable goal so efforts can
be turned to more productive activities. If an individual persists in pursuing an unreachable goal, ordinary negative affect can escalate into
pathological depression” (2009, 23).
Note that in this theory, depression is not caused by stress or anxiety, but rather by the inability to disengage from an unreachable goal.19 I
will return to this later, but Nesse posits that stress or anxiety is caused
by the fact that one is not able to reach a specific goal in the current
environment (for instance, not finding happiness in a relationship).
Recently, Nesse (Keller & Nesse 2005; Keller & Miller 2006; see
also Keller et al. 2007) has suggested that selection might have shaped
different subtypes of depression to deal with different types of problems. This prediction resulted from the “situation-symptom congruence hypothesis” according to which symptoms should be adapted to
deal with adaptative challenges characteristic of the different type of
situations. According to the studies he conducted, bereavement and romantic breakups are associated with different symptoms than chronic
stress and failures (sadness, anhedonia, appetite loss and guilt in the
first and fatigue and hypersomnia in the last).20
As mentioned earlier, the adoption of evolutionary perspectives is
motivated not only by new testable hypotheses that one can derive
from it, but also by the possibility of explaining general as well as individual vulnerability. At the present time, there is no accepted explanation of general vulnerability: Nesse mentions the possibility that
we might live in a depressogenic world (where goals are often times
unrealistic), or that new physical factors like artificial light, changes
in exercise or diet might influence brain mechanisms responsible for
depression. Other explanations might make reference to the fact that
traits such as low mood tend to have a high variance between individuals, so much so that some might be at the pathological extreme
of the spectrum. As for individual vulnerability, as stated earlier, there
is a genetic polymorphism on the 5-HTT gene that increases the risk
of depression. Though there is no current hypothesis concerning the
possible benefits of having the S 5-HTT, an evolutionary perspective
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suggests that there might be benefits linked to certain circumstances,
which might motivate research in this direction. Nesse also mentions
the fact that exposure to repeated episodes of stress might lower the
threshold of low mood until it becomes pathological.
In “The Bright Side of Feeling Blue” (2009), Andrews and Thomson
propose what they call a “social navigation hypothesis of depression”.
Their hypothesis belongs to a family of models that put forward the role
of depression in social relationships as well as asserting its functional
nature (I am not arguing that all social theories of depression advocate
for an adaptative view of depression; see for instance Allen & Badcock
2006). Before turning to their model, I present quickly some of the
other models belonging to that family.
The first model is called the “social competition” or “social rank”
theory of depression. Price and colleagues (1997) advocated this position, suggesting that depression is an “involuntary subordinate strategy” (sometimes also called “involuntary defeat strategy” or IDS, Sloman (2008)) that evolved from mechanisms mediating ranking behavior. Price and colleagues state that depression has three functions: (1)
preventing an individual from making a costly comeback when their
defeat in a hierarchical struggle is inevitable; (2) sending a “no threat
signal” to dominant individuals; (3) placing the individual in a state
of yielding which encourages acceptance of the outcome. As Sloman
puts it: “It is exquisitely designed to influence the individual to give up
certain aspirations such as winning the affection of a possible mate, or
to end a confrontation. It can lead to submission, the development of
more realistic goals and a redirection of energy towards more productive pursuits.” (2008, 221).21
Note that, for the authors, depression is not always adaptative (one
might wonder if these researchers shouldn’t have distinguished low
mood from clinical depression). As Sloman recently put it: “In general, depression and anxiety are adaptative when they are switched off
early before they become too intense. Because a mechanism that is
proving ineffective in coping with agonistic conflict tends to become
more entrenched which makes it more difficult to switch it off and the
continued action of the mechanism may lead to a maladaptative cycle
of escalating depression or anxiety.” (2008, 222).
A second model is the “depression as bargaining model” proposed
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by Hagen (1999; 2002). In short, depression is seen as a sort of strike,
i.e. it is a way for an individual to say that they are not accepting the
terms of relationship anymore, and that they are demanding a better
treatment. As Hagen puts it: “When simple defection from a costly
cooperative venture is socially constrained because, for example, each
participant has a monopoly on essential resources or can impose costs
on defection, individuals suffering net costs from their participation
may benefit by withholding the benefits they are providing until better terms are offered, that is, they may benefit by bargaining or ‘going
on strike”’ (2002, 324). Hagen has tested his theory using postpartum
depression as a model for depression in general. This decision allows
one to make a number of predictions. Among those: (1) individuals
with no other children and few future chances to invest in offspring
(those who have everything to loose) should have lower level of PPD;
(2) individuals who for social reasons (social norms on abortion, for instance) are forced to have unwanted children should experience higher
level of PPD (new costs are imposed on the individual who may want
to renegotiate his or her current arrangement); (3) PPD in one spouse
should be associated with increased parental investment by the other
spouse. All these predictions where confirmed according to Hagen.
Andrews and Thomson’s theory has a family resemblance with Hagen’s; like him, they view depression as a form of strategy to extort
increased investment from others. Their theory also tries to explain
the cognitive features of depression, which Hagen’s theory leaves unexplained (Watson & Andrews 2002, 3). Using both Andrews and Thomson’s recent paper, and Watson and Andrews (2002) earlier position
statement, I’ll present their explanation of these cognitive features (on
which they put much more emphasis in their recent paper), after which
I’ll return to the social motivation features of depression.
According to Andrews and Thomson, depression is “an evolved
stress response mechanism” (2009, 621). More precisely, its function
is to deal with two classes of problems: social dilemmas and avoidable
stressors.22 The authors state that these problems are complex and
should be addressed in an analytical way, in that they must be broken
down into smaller pieces to be resolved.23 Thus, if depression is designed to help resolve these kinds of problems, it must “promote an
analytical reasoning style in which greater attention is paid to detail
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and information is processed more slowly, methodically, thoroughly,
and in smaller chunks” (idem, p. 622). This is exactly what most features of depression can be thought of as doing.
Andrews and Thomson state that the central designed feature of depression is rumination, which can be seen as an analytical and methodological way of considering complex problems whose goal is to generate and evaluate solutions to these problems. This is consistent with
studies that show that depressive thinking is more analytical in nature,
and is focused on “regretful thoughts”, i.e., focused on understanding
why an episode happened and what could have been done to avoid
it (Andrews and Thomson call this ‘upward counterfactual thinking’).
Other features of depression might also be considered as adaptative, to
name a few:
• Depressive individuals tend to attribute more of their failures to
their lack of ability and more of their success to chance while
non-depressives show the inverse pattern. Due to this, some refer
to a ‘depressive attributional style’ (2009, 636). This style makes
them less prone to the fundamental attribution error.
• Negative mood also seems to lead to more accurate decisions related to complex situations, but also to conservative implementation strategies for these decisions than those in positive moods.
• In certain complex situations, depressed individuals are better
than non-depressed individuals at estimating the control they exert on a situation (2009, 639).
• “[...] depressed people are more sensitive to costs of cooperating
than nondepressed people and are more likely to defect when it
is costly to cooperate” (2009, 634).
The other features generally associated with depression, such as anhedonia and psychomotor changes, sleeping and eating dysfunctions,
would be mechanisms that contribute to ensuring undisturbed rumination. For instance, anhedonia would assist rumination by making the
individual indifferent to pleasures that could distract them from problem solving. Preference for solitude (a psychomotor change) would
also help the depressive individual by promoting avoidance of social
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contact that can be cognitively demanding. This idea predicts a relationship between rumination and anhedonia so that need for more
rumination should produce more intense anhedonia. In the case of
psychomotor changes, it predicts that if an environment is conducive
to rumination, lethargy will work to keep the invidual in that environment, but if the environment is not conducive to rumination, it will
motivate them to look for superior environments (and lead to agitation).
What makes their “analytical rumination hypothesis” interesting
(ARH; idem, p. 623) is the idea that since most cognitive resources
are devoted to solving the complex problems that triggered depression, there are none left for other non-related tasks. This would explain
the poor results of depressive individuals on laboratory tasks. Indeed,
when distracted from thinking about their problems, depressive individuals’ performances on memory or executive control tasks are similar
to non-depressive individuals, while they are impaired otherwise. Contrary to what has been traditionally proposed on the basis of laboratory
task results, depressive cognition is not dysfunctional, rather it is perfectly tailored to solving a specific kind of problem.24 For instance,
analyzing problems requires using working memory (WM). Due to the
gravity of the problem considered by the depressive individual, all resources should be devoted to the problem; therefore irrelevant tasks
that tap WM will show poorer results. These poorer results are not
explained by a dysfunctional WM, but rather by the fact that this structure has limited resources and is impervious to disruptive conditions;
in other words, it is distraction-resistant (this may be achieved via attention control structures, as suggested by increased activity in the left
VLPFC25 ).
ARH makes four claims:
(1) Complex problems trigger depressed affect;
(2) Depression coordinates changes in body systems that promote
sustained analysis of the triggering problem;
(3) Depressive rumination often helps people solve the triggering
problem;
(4) Depression reduces performance on laboratory tasks because depressive rumination takes up limited processing resources.
www.thebalticyearbook.org
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Now a few words about the motivational aspect of depression. Previously, Sloman, Gilbert and McGuire and others think that the function of depression is to send a “no threat” message to social dominants.
This would function to reduce aggression towards the depressive individual. Andrews and Thomson makes a different claim. In their view—
and consistent with Hagen’s position—depression is used as a means to
gather social support either by honestly signaling need (in this framework, suicidality can be seen as adaptative: “As an honest signal, the
risk of death associated with a suicidal attempt could inform partners
about the attempter’s level of need” (9)) or by motivating fitness extortion, that is, in showing that one is ready to inflict costs onto themselves
and others, in order to acquire more support or a new social role. A
prediction that follows from this model is that depression should end
when support is gathered.26 It also predicts that depression should
generate more support from closer social partners than distant ones.
Finally, it predicts that depression should increase when one is taken
away from their social milieu (for instance, by being hospitalized).
So because depression is conceived as an adaptation to solve a
specific kind of problem, “... performance on the triggering problem
[should be considered] as a crucial metric for evaluative depressive
cognition. [...] the conclusion that depression impairs social skills
depends on accepting the notion that some behaviors, such as friendliness and cooperation, are always better for social problem solving,
regardless of the situation or context. A more direct definition of social competence is simply the ability to achieve social goals, especially
in situations of social conflict.” (637). In other words, what appears
as cognitive and social malfunctions might indeed be functional (but
disvalued) ways to achieved adaptative goals.
*
As we have seen in this section:
(1) Evolutionary hypotheses about the same disorder can diverge.
(2) Specifically concerning depression: some hypotheses might explain depression as a disorder resulting from vulnerabilities (i.e.
Nesse’s); while others might defend what Murphy labeled as a
“persistence explanation” according to which putative disorders
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are indeed adaptive in current environments (i.e. Andrews and
Thompson’s); while finally others revert to mismatch explanation
(as in the case of SAD).
(3) One has to distinguish between evolved defense and disorder.
The symptoms of depression function similarly to pain, fever
or cough: they are normal symptoms that have a function of
defending the body against some harmful stimuli or infection.
They might sometimes be dysfunctional, but in order to determine this, one needs to know if the stimuli or virus are present,
and if the response is proportional to the danger (i.e. in the case
of chronic pain, it appears that the pain response is unrelated to
anything in the environment). To distinguish between evolved
defense and disorder in the case of depression, one needs to
know if an individual’s response is disproportionate to its cause.
Here the “cause” is not an objective feature of the environment,
but a construct that depends in large measure on the subject’s
motivational structure (what are their goals, how they assess the
situation, etc.). Depression could be normal response to a life
event, therefore it would be a mistake to establish a diagnosis
based only on the presence of symptoms.27
(4) One interesting proposal made by Nesse is that depression is a
generic term which encompasses different types of responses to
loss. Each type of response is tailored to the problem it tries
to solve (loss of romantic partner, loss of social position, etc.).
Accordingly, Andrews and Thompson’s view could be seen as describing one subtype of depression.28
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Blanchette 2011). These problems do not affect the general framework, but rather particular hypotheses about specific mental disorders.
As stated earlier, for evolutionists, psychiatry’s destiny is linked
with progress in evolutionary psychology. The first problem relates
to some of evolutionary psychology’s limits. Evolutionary psychology’s
central theoretical commitment, which allows the use of both of its
methods (i.e. adaptative thinking and reverse engineering), is to the
existence of a strong relationship between biological form and adaptative forces. Without such a relationship, there would be no reason to
expect that isolating adaptative problems will be of any help in discovering the architecture of the mind, or that starting with known mechanisms will lead to the reliable discovery of adaptative pressures that
have acted on them in the past. As Griffiths (1996) observed, “... adaptative generalizations ... cannot explain form except in conjunction
with a rich set of historical initial conditions” (515). In short, to say
that a trait or a mechanism is an adaptation is to make an historical
claim to the effect that the presence of the trait in actual population is
explained by the fact that it was more adaptative than others in a past
environment. More precisely, an adaptation is relative to:
1) Traits that were present at the same time at the moment of selection;
2) A particular selective regime (environmental pressures).
Adaptations are usually identified using the comparative method, which
consists of comparing a trait to the ones from phylogenetic ancestors,
and to prevalent environmental conditions. By using this method, it is
shown that

(5) Being aware of the “ecological function” of the symptoms of depression (or low mood) helps in the design of “ecologically valid”
experiments to test their adaptativity.

1) A trait had not given an adaptative advantage to its bearer over
others who didn’t have it, therefore it can’t be an adaptation;

9. PROBLEMS WITH THE EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO SPECIFIC
MENTAL DISORDERS

2) 2) If the trait appears in the phylogentic ancestors of the actual
bearers before, or independent of being exposed to the new selective regime, it can’t be an adaptation to this particular regime.

In this section, I will briefly present two problems for the evolutionary approach to psychiatry (for more see Murphy & Stich 2000; Murphy 2006; and Faucher in preparation a; in preparation b; Faucher &
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present at the same time at the moment of selection; (2) traits possessed by the immediate ancestors of the bearer of the studied trait; (3)
the particular selective regime under which selection has taken place.
Sometimes we do have the information needed to establish that
a human trait (the one that psychiatry is interested by) is an adaptation: for instance, we have access to traits that were present in our
non-human primate ancestors or to traits which vary according to certain features of the evolutionary environment of adaptation (as in the
case of malaria resistance, AIDS resistance, skin color or lactose tolerance). The problem is, for many specifically universal human adaptations, there is not the evidence necessary to establish that a trait is an
adaptation. As Kaplan put it: “I argue that such evidence is rarely available in the case of purported ‘universal’ human psychological adaptations. The very limited information available on the environments in
which key aspects of human evolution took place makes optimization
techniques difficult to apply here. Futher, while in some cases phylogenetic information about Hominidea may provide evidence relevant to
adaptative hypotheses in humans, nature and history have ‘conspired’
to make the task more difficult with humans than it is in many other
species” (2002, 297).29
What this means for evolutionary psychiatry is that it will be possible to establish the evolutionary functional criteria for some mechanisms that evolved before the Homo genus. For instance, if Price and
colleagues are right about depression,30 we should be able to use the
comparative method and establish that the mechanism is an adaptation. Similarly, in principle it should be possible establish the adaptative character of traits that vary inside the human population. The case
of psychopathy is an example of a trait where the comparative method
could be used (even if it seems that there are some obstacles to its application, as noted by Murphy 2005, 759). For some mechanisms (the
number of which has to be empirically determined31 ), we might just
never know the facts necessary to establish that they are adaptations
(for similar claims, see Richardson 2007, 38).32 Therefore, judgments
about their dysfunction will be based on hunches about what is normal
or abnormal; as the past amply demonstrates, (in cases of masturbation, homosexuality, or female orgasm), hunches are unreliable, as they
are especially open to the influence of values and norms.
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The second problem involves the fact that, as Murphy puts it, evolutionary psychiatry is “unfaithful to the psychology [it tries] to explain”
(2005, 746). In short, evolutionary psychiatry sometimes explains an
aspect of a disorder or a particular symptom, leaving aside other aspects or symptoms. Murphy highlights this particular failure when he
writes: “One of the besetting sins of evolutionary psychology is the
tendency to take some crude characterization of a human capacity and
try to explain that” (idem, 762). Take the case of depression from the
previous section: Nesse as well as Andrews and Thompson are trying
to account for a number of aspects of depression or low mood. But
they leave other aspects unexplained. I’ll consider a few of them in the
following section.
Kendler’s work (Kendler et al. 2006, 2009) suggests that there are
at least three, maybe four, major pathways that lead to depression (internalizing symptoms, externalizing symptoms, adversity and interpersonal difficulty as well as one linked with vascular disease in late age
onset patients). Many of these pathways (except the last one) include
events that took place in early childhood. Given this, one might be
tempted to say there might be different subtypes of depression. Among
these subtypes, some might be adaptative, some not (because they are
vestige, like SAD, or because they are the result of non-adaptative random genetic mutations), some might be the result of the cognitive malfunction of adaptative mechanisms specialized to deal with some problems (due to social factors, like poor parenting or abuse), while others
might be the result of brain structure breakdowns that affect mood.
Keller and Nesse’s (2005; 2006) proposition heads in the right direction by identifying two subtypes of depression. The problem is that
they focus exclusively on types of depression linked with adversity or
interpersonal difficulties, which according to Kendler, represent only
a subtype of depression; they owe an explanation of other forms of
depression. By focusing only on the resolution of complex social problems, Andrews and Thomson’s theory can be seen as the explanation
of only one subtype of depression, so it leaves unexplained other types
of depression, as well as depressions resulting from other pathways.
Murphy (2006) remarks that many symptoms of major depression
are left unexplained by Nesse. Why exactly does the breakdown of the
low mood mechanism generate loss of sleep or inability to make deci-
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sions or concentrate? Further, why is the disengagement mechanism
unaccompanied by a positive affect or motivational structure of some
sort that would cause the behavior to change?
This idea has precedence in the literature. For instance, animals in
conditions featuring severe food restrictions will increase, not decrease
their energy expenditure and increase their risk-taking behavior. Indeed, in a recent paper Nettle (2009) uses optimal-foraging models
which suggest that Nesse is right: “when things are going quite badly,
it is not time to take risks, but as things improve, greater experimentation is warranted” (3). However, the model also predicts that “... there
comes a dire point beyond which it is maladaptative to avoid risks and
conserve energy: the situation is already too dangerous for that. Instead, the individual should be highly motivated to take risks and try
new solutions; to do anything that has any chance of returning her to
the acceptable range of states” (3). Nettle notes that this state might be
found in patients classified as depressive because of their negative affective tone, but whose symptoms include locomotor acceleration and
restlessness, and feelings of racing thoughts, as well as the desire to
follow risky pleasurable impulses (this might be thought of as a form
of “dysphoric mania”). What Nettle proposes is a further refinement
of functional theories of the kind defended by Nesse. Adaptative responses in the case of loss of resources will be different as a function of
the evaluation of the severity of the condition in which the individual
finds himself or herself. As Nesse puts it, “[t]he mood responses to different types of situations will show different suites of design features
that represent adaptative strategies in that context ... Thus, a mood
representing a response to dire circumstances could involve simultaneous activation of negative emotion systems ... and behavior approach
systems. Such a mood state would be like depression, in its negativity,
but also like positive mood, in its energy and risk-proneness” (4). Here,
it seems, it is still possible to salvage Nesse’s theory.
Andrews and Thomson’s theory faired slightly better in the sense
that it incorporates all features associated with depression. Although I
have not presented it here, it also explains why (and predicts in which
situations, 2009, p. 645) people will attempt to escape pain generated by depression (a note: if individuals continued avoiding thinking
about the situation, that would be an argument against their theory).
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Their idea that features of rumination might be adaptative, and that
the allocation of cognitive resources to social problems might impede
non-relevant laboratory tasks is worth exploring. One problem with
their account is the fact that, as Nettle pointed out, “all normal human
beings have the capacity to feel physical pain [...] However, there is
no evidence that all individuals have the capacity to become clinically
depressed. Rather, it seems likely that most depression is the result of
an inherited diathesis borne by a minority of the population” (2004,
93).33
Another problem with their proposal is the fact that they assume
that the triggers of depression are social or predominantly social in
nature. Here, one might wonder about the direction of causality. Is
depression caused by social problems or are social problems caused by
depression? Depression can cause marital problems, lack of social support, or defection of social partners, all of which are also identified as
factors in depression. If depression is caused by social problems, how
does it fair in getting additional support or new deals with cooperative
partners? Hagen has provided data for PPD, but no such data are available for depression in general. For the time being, it does not fit well
with the demobilization and the social withdrawal that characterize
depression (Allen & Badcock 2006, 818).
If the mechanism underlying depression is adaptative and is designed to solve social problems, why is it that, as per Keller et al.
(2007), 70% of people who suffer from bouts of major depression will
have at least another episode and 20% will develop a chronic condition (rate of continuous freedom from illness is very low, around 11%
over 25 years; Nettle 2004, 95)? What this suggests is, as Murphy
notes, “if depression is an adaptation designed to make them [the depressive] function better in society, it is not working” (295). Indeed,
once depression has achieved its function, shouldn’t it disappear? Why
is it becoming chronic in 20% of cases? As Nettle (2004) and Nesse
(2000a) observe, as depressive episodes continue (for third and subsequent episodes of endogeneous depression), the triggers that are required to produce depression become smaller and less related to life
events.
Andrews and Thomson also pretend that depressive individuals have
cognitive features that facilitate the resolution of social problems. Yet
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as Nettle (2004) points out, they also have cognitive features that
might handicap them for this task: depressive individuals are slower
and less accurate than control subjects when reading non-verbal social
cues, they show impaired social skills, seem to be more realistic than
others only when the normal population is unrealistically positive (and
depressive individuals are unrealistic when the normal population is
reasonably accurate) and “... depressives perform worse than controls
on tasks designed to tap inter-personal problem solving skills” (96).34
Finally, Andrews and Thomson are not able to explain the comorbidity of anxiety and depression,35 nor for that matter, the comorbidity
of depression and hypomania. Nesse fairs slightly better on this account because he at least tries to explain it, even if his account is not
very convincing. He states that “like pain and fever, anxiety and depression are nonspecific symptoms that can be aroused by many different
problems, so comorbidity and heterogeneity are to be expected” (2012,
5). What would be needed for this to be convincing are more precise
predictions in regards to when such comorbidity is to be expected.
All in all, each explanation of depression explains some aspects of
depression, but leaves others unexplained. One could defend evolutionary psychiatry by saying that the science is young and that one has
to start somewhere in the explanation of mental disorders such as depression; with time, other symptoms of depression will eventually be
explained. I believe that this is possible and I would not want to foreclose such a possibility. At this time however, we have to keep in mind
that evolutionary psychiatry’s conclusions are very provisionary—more
so than in other sectors of science—they are explanations in the making, and we should not draw too much from them for therapeutic purposes.
Compounded with the first obstacle, the second obstacle should
make it obvious that evolutionary psychiatry is not ready to deliver the
proverbial goods yet. At present, it can’t offer well-confirmed theories,
and it may never be able to produce such theories in certain cases,
but it can play a heuristic function by changing the focus of current
brain sciences, and by questioning traditional positions in this field (by
introducing the idea of functional low mood that appears similar to
depression, etc).
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10. CONCLUSION

I will conclude this paper by recapitulating how well an evolution inspired psychiatry would fare in providing solutions to the four problems we identified in section 2.
Concerning our first problem, we have seen that there have been
many attempts to provide a definition of mental disorder that would
ground a psychiatric classification by using an evolutionary approach.
Concerning the definition of mental disorder, we have explained the
reasons why some have rejected Kendell’s and Boorse’s accounts (mainly
because it was concerned with actual adaptativeness of mechanisms).
We then turned to Wakefield’s definition. We saw that there were problems with both the idea that the concept to be analysed is a concept
shared by everyone (lay people as well as professionals) and with the
proposed method of studying that concept (conceptual analysis vs empirical method). For a number of reasons presented in the paper, I
think that it would be better to adopt a different attitude (a somewhat
revisonary attitude) towards the definition of mental disorder. This
attitude is in line with Boorse’s proposal. I argued that for practical
purposes we should use the notion of “treatable conditions” to refer
to the conditions that are the object of psychiatric concern. For scientific prurposes, we might want to use a notion of function inspired by
evolutionary theory to single out psychological mechanisms that are
the source of psychiatric problems. But one has to be aware that psychology did not and does not need such theory to single out the mechanisms it studies. Therefore, one will have to provide an argument
concerning the advantage of adopting an evolutionary perspective (I
think that there is at least a heuristic advantage to doing so).
How does the evolutionary approach answers Szasz’ concern about
psychiatry? Well, first it shows that, after all, mental illness is literally, and not metaphorically as Szasz claimed it was, a physical illness.
A mental illness has to do with the harmful dysfunction or disorder
of computational devices or mental organs that constitute our mind.
Since these devices are thought to supervene on the brain, it is expected
that a dysfunction produced by a disordered psychological mechanism
will have a physical base.36 What the evolutionary perspective to disorder suggests, however, is that we cannot merely identify disorders
by looking at the brain. Rather, we need to know what the (normal)
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functions the brain is supposed to carry out are before being able to
make such an identification. And as we have seen, minds meeting
their evolutionary criteria of functioning are not always producing behaviors that we value (as the case of primary sociopathy illustrates).
The problem, as I have shown in section 9, is that evolutionary psychiatry might never be able to provide a theory of normal function for a
certain (limited) set of traits. If such is the case, the door is wide open
to a predominant role for values and norms in diagnosis and for the
unfortunate consequences that Szasz was preoccupied with.
As for the third question, it seems clear to many that evolutionary psychology can provide us with a scientific image of the normal
functioning of the mind. As Nesse puts it: “Evolutionary biology offers
psychiatry the conceptual tools needed to construct a framework for
understanding normal mental function akin to that which physiology
provides for understanding the normal functions of other bodily systems.” (1991, p. 24–25). As we saw, this image of the normal mind
has the particularity of taking into account the features of the environment that provoke certain reactions that are the object of psychiatric
preoccupation (for exemple, a depressive reaction or a hallucination).
Symptoms of depression can thus be elements of a normal reaction in
certain contexts, just as pain might be a normal reaction in response
to certain nociceptive stimuli. And as it is not by looking at the brain
mechanisms underlying pain reactions that one knows if it is or is not
normal, it is not by looking at the brain mechanisms underlying the
depressive symptoms that one will know if it is a normal reaction or a
pathological one.
If evolutionary psychology’s picture of the mind is accurate, it is
possible that the image of the architecture of the normal mind might
be more complicated than has been first thought. First, as we saw
in section 7, evolutionary psychology claims that it can remove the
blinders of our imagination when the time comes to postulate psychological mechanisms. Second, there are, as we saw in section 8.1, reasons to think that Mother Nature has settled for more than one kind of
mind. Indeed, the work of evolutionists makes it clear that we are dealing with a polymorphic mind (see for instance Kimura (2000)).37 But
again, this revolutionary potential of evolutionary depends ultimately
on its capacity to deliver the goods, that is, its capacity to validate the
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existence of the mechanisms it postulates and their functions. And as
section 9 showed, this is not only difficult, it might also be impossible
in certain cases.
The answer to the fourth question is probably the most straightforward. The lesson that can be drawn from the two examples of section 8
is that the evolutionary way of thinking is likely to lead to a fragmentation of conditions that seem, at the phenomenological level, homogenous (for instance, primary and secondary sociopathy or depression
caused by romantic breakup and by the death of a loved one). The
idea that what has been classified under current psychopathological
concepts is indeed a multitude of different conditions would explain
the fact that in cases like depression, for example, “... some instances
[...] remit spontaneously; some respond to one type of anti-depression
medication but not to another; some do not respond to any type of
medication but response to electroconvulsive treatment [...] (McGuire
et al. 1997a, 257). The complicating factor here has to do with what
have been called the “common final pathway phenomena”, i.e. the idea
that “multiple causes can lead to similar phenotypes because of constraints on phenotypic expression” (McGuire et al. 1997a, 257). Since
similar expressions might have different etiologies, some can be core
adaptations (low mood), while some others can be just maladaptative
(chronic depression). As we have seen, the evolutionary approach to
psychiatry acts as a prophylactic against the temptation to posit a “unitary adaptative explanation” for each mental condition (see also Nesse
1991, 35). But if evolutionary psychiatry is to play such a role, it has
to be true to the psychology it tries to explain. And as Murphy claims,
and as I tried to show, this is not always the case.
*
A few years ago, Ian Hacking made the following remark concerning
mental illness and psychiatry:
“We have objective difficulties, at present, in grappling with
the idea of real mental illnesses. This is not because we are
in general prone to confusion about reality, but because
psychiatry is in a transitional stage in the development of
treatments for, and diagnoses of, mental illnesses. We think
the problem is about reality when in fact the difficulty lies
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in the rapid progress of psychiatry itself.
[...] We have the feeling that there is some fixed, super
thing about mental illness, a reality that divides the real
illnesses from the fakes. I believe that our conceptions
of real illnesses are of necessity being, as Putnam puts it,
renegotiated at present. This is because of rapid changes
in biological and chemical psychiatry” (1998, p. 92-95).
I believe that Hacking is right in thinking that we are currently renegotiating our conceptions of (real) mental illness, but as this paper has
made clear, it is not at all clear that, or how, these renegotiations should
also include the insights provided by the evolutionary approach.
Notes
1
Evolutionary psychiatry is sometimes also called “evolutionary psychopathology”
(Kennair 2003), and “darwinian psychiatry” (McGuire & Troisi 1998).
2
See Adriaens & De Block (2010) who refer to these older versions of evolutionary
psychiatry as “psychiatric darwinism”. Their intent is to distinguish a tradition which
used Darwin’s idea, but was imbued by non-darwinian ideas, like Lamarckism or degeneration theories, from the more recent enterprise that has its roots in contemporary
biology and cognitive sciences. For a well worked-out example of the influence of evolutionary theory on psychiatry, see Sulloway 1992.
3
The other classification system of mental disorders is the chapter 8 of the International Classification of Diseases or ICD. Many of the problems affecting the DSM are also
affecting the ICD. For the sake of space, I will focus my attention on the DSM only.
4
Nesse makes a similar remark, saying that: “The psychiatrist does not know the normal functions of the systems disrupted by mental disorders, except in the most general
terms. For example, when a patient presents with depression, the psychiatrist does not
know the normal functions of the capacity for mood and therefore has difficulty in distinguishing between normal and pathological sadness. When a patient presents with
extreme jealousy, few psychiatrists understand its evolutionary origins and functions”
(1991, p. 24).
5
One reason for this state of affairs is that the conceptors of the DSM have tried to
produce a “theory-free” nosology. Spitzer, who worked on revising the DSM, explained
the reason why psychiatric diagnosis has culminated in categories based on observation and induction, rather than theory. According to him, it is “[b]ecause no particular
orientation or limited subgroup of schools has established its credentials as the sole scientific approach, [and, for that reason,] there remains no scientific criterion for officially
adopting one orientation over the others. Thus the field of psychiatry must somehow accommodate all the divergent schools and yet arrive at a single classified scheme that all
agree to use. How then to reach agreement amid such unyeilding disagreement? The authors of DMS-III sought to achieve this agreement by separating psychiatric observation
from psychiatric theory. The common classification scheme would consist of categories
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whose meanings could be defined as far as possible through direct observation. In this
way the adherents of different schools could nonetheless agree on basic terminology because disputes regarding definitions could be settled by appeal to what all could observe
and could no reasonably deny. ... Agreement over terminology requires, then, that the
definitions of the terms remain operational and atheoretical.” (1978, p. 92)
6
As Nesse and Stein illustrate this point by using the following telling example: “...
the DSM-II definition of Depressive Neurosis was: ’An excessive reaction of depression
due to an internal conflict or to an identifiable event such as the loss of a love object
or cherished possession’. Is depression after the loss of a favorite cat ‘excessive’? One
diagnostician would say, ‘Yes’, another, ‘Obviously not!’ Such unreliability made research
impossible, and psychiatry’s scientific aspirations laughable” (2012, p. 1)
7
According to Schaffner, “this approach typically involves a search for neuroanatomical, neurophysiological or molecular genetic factors, and thus tends to be reductive or
reductionistic” (2002, p. 222).
8
The hope to isolate discrete entities that correspond to the DSM’s diagnostic categories starts to wane as research moves forward. As Hyman puts it: “Insights emerging
from genetics and, increasingly, from neuroscience suggest that the exclusive use of categorical diagnoses and the predominant ‘splitting’ approach of the DSM-III and DSM-IV
represent obstacles to the near-term development of a more scientifically and clinically
satisfactory classification” (2011, 3). For an example of results coming from genetics and
neurosciences that suggest problems with current classificatory assumptions, see Happé
et al. 2006.
9
Recently, Wakefield defined a bit more precisely ‘mental’ in ‘mental disorder’: “Mental dysfunctions are not specific mental states but rather dysfunctions in the brain mechanisms designed to produce or regulate mental states, and the dysfunction emerges in
irregularities in the production and the regulation of mental states” (2007b, 127).
10
That surely does not mean that it is without problems. For instance, it is not clear for
whom the dysfunction has to be harmful to be judged as a fullfledged “harmful dysfunction”. Does it have to be harmful for an individual, his genes, his family or the society in
general?
11
Neander (1995) notes rightly that this notion of normativity is neither evaluative nor
statistical. As she writes: “Teenage fertility is biologically normal, but it does not follow
that teenage fertility is a good thing; on the contrary, if we could induce (temporary and
reversible) infertility in all girls under the age of twenty, that would probably be better
[Boorse 1975]. Judging that something is functioning properly is not the same as judging
that its functioning is good. Nor is the judgement that something is functioning properly
just a statistical abstraction, as epidemic and pandemic diseases testify. If we were all
struck blind it would still be the function of our eyes to see. Sight, not blindness, would
remain biologically normal proper functioning, and blindness, not sight, would remain
dysfunctional. Not suprisingly, we can’t cure diseases just by spreading them around” (p.
111).
12
It is possible that those intuitions come from the fact that we consider the environment as part of the organism (a sort of “extended phenotype” view) or that we use
another notion of function than the one suggested by Wakefield. It is possible that we
are using “function” to talk about the “current adaptivity” of behaviors, that we are using the probable future selective success rather than past historical success as a way of
establishing functionality.
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13
A similar move is proposed, for different reasons, by Bentall who suggests to “[abandon] psychiatric diagnoses altogether. Instead of attempting to explain mythical diagnostic entities, we should try and explain the actual complaints that patients bring to the
clinic, such as hallucinations, delusions, disordered communication and mania” (2006,
224). Bentall’s proposal is not a reaction to conflicting intuitions concerning mental disorders but rather to the rejection of the belief in disorders as “discrete entities”. He thinks
that psychiatry should be concerned by cognitive endophenotypes rather than disorders.
14
“[T]he brain is composed of many different programs, many (or all) of which will
be specialized for solving their own corresponding adaptive problems. That is, the evolutionary process will not produce a predominantly general-purpose equipotential, domain-general architecture” (Tooby & Cosmides 2005, 17).
15
“Human behavioral ecology applies the theoretical perspective of animal behavioral
ecology to human populations, examining the degree to which behavior is adaptively adjusted to environmental (including social) conditions, emphazing conditional strategies
of the form “in situation X, maximize fitness payoffs by doing a; in situation Y, do b”.”
(Smith et al. 2001, 128)
16
Notice here that the use of evolutionary psychology leads psychiatrists to adopt a version of ‘cognitive neuropsychiatry’ or CNP (Halligan & David 2001). CNP “attempts to
bridge this gap [between cognition and neuroscience] by first, establishing the functional
organization of psychiatric disorders within a framework of human cognitive neuropsychology, and second, linking this framework to relevant brain structures and their pathology” (Halligan & David 2001, 209; see also Hohwy & Rosenberg 2005). Like cognitive
neuropsychology (Shallice 1988), CNP starts with a picture of the mind as constituted
by specialized information processing mechanisms (like a belief-formation mechanism,
a face recognition mechanism, a control of action mechanism, etc.) and postulates that
it is these mechanisms that break in particular disorders. The picture of the mind is informed both by our lay-theory of mental functions and by retroactions from psychiatry
that sometimes force modification of our lay-theory. Evolutionary psychiatry is a version
of CPN in that rather than starting with a lay-theory of mental functions, it starts with
a picture of mental functions informed by the evolutionary theory (for instance by the
kinds of problems that the mind has been designed to solve).
17
According to a rather dominant evolutionary view about emotions, they “... are
modes of functioning, shaped by natural selection, that coordinate physiological, cognitive, motivational, behavioral, and subjective responses in patterns that increase the
ability to meet the adaptive challenges of situations that have recurred over evolutionary
time. They are adaptations that are useful only in certain situations” (Nesse 2009, 129;
see also Cosmides & Tooby 2005b).
18
Pleiotropy might be one important key to the explanation of comorbidity as “... a
few genes have extensive pleiotropic effects, but most genes are more limited in their
effects on the phenotype. However, nearly all genes have some degree of pleiotropy. ...
[certain studies show that in animal models, like c. elegans or the fruit fly] each genes
... affects on average four or five proteins ... [in other studies it has been found that] the
number of traits affected per gene was about six or seven” (Stearns 2010, 770-771).
19
Leahy’s (1997) sunk costs model suggests “that depression occurs when people persevere too long with behaviours resulting in low or diminishing rewards” (Allen & Badcock 2006, 816).
20
Other subtypes might include seasonal affective disorder (SAD) which is a recurrent
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depression associated with winter and which is characterized by fatigue, increased appetite, sleeping and carbohydrate craving. Nesse (2000a) make the hypothesis that low
mood might be a variant or remnant of a hibernation response in some remote ancestor.
It would make sense, apparently, to slow down your activities in a period of the year
where resources are scarce. But in the kind of environment in which we live now where
seasons are playing a minor role in the food acquisition process, such a mechanism has
no function anymore.
21
This hypothesis has found support in studies made by Raleigh and McGuire who
found that in vervet monkeys the highest ranking males (alpha) had levels of serotonin
twice as high as other males (as Murphy (2006, 292) notes, this shift in serotonin levels
associated with change of social ranks is also found in lobsters and crayfish). When an
alpha male lost his position, his serotonin levels fell immediately and he huddled and
rocked, refusing food, which are behavior characteristic of depression in humans (thus
making us think that it is what they experienced). They also found that if they removed
the alpha male from the rest of the group and gave some antidepressants to a male
randomly chosen, that individual becomes in every instance the alpha male (see also,
McGuire et al. 1997a).
22
Note that this is a move from Andrews’ previous theory where he stated that “[t]he
functional domain of depression may be social complexity” (Watson & Andrews 2002,
4), in that depression is now not only exclusively devoted to solving social problems.
Still, in their more recent paper, they suggest that “complex social problems may be the
primary evolutionarily relevant trigger of depression in human beings” (626).
23
The authors propose that their position implies the existence of a mechanism that
distinguishes simple from complex problems (2009, 625).
24
Indeed, the fact that depression seems so exquisitely designed for solving an adaptative problem suggests that it is an adaptation. As they put it : “ ... depression evolved
by natural selection because there is a neurological orderliness that appears to specifically and proficiently promote analysis in depressive rumination and is not likely to have
evolved by chance.” (2009, 623)
25
Because sustained firing of neurons augments the chance of neuronal apoptosis (programed cell death), Andrews and Thomson affirm that there should be a mechanism that
reduces it. According to them, this mechanism involved an augmentation of the production of 5 HT. The idea that depression could be characterized by an increased production
of 5 HT goes against common wisdom on depression, but the authors claimed to have
evidence that it is the case. I won’t try to evaluate their claim here (but they would need
to explain why another structure like the hippocampus that has a lot of 5 HT receptors
is getting smaller).
26
“Recovery from depression is hastened by improvements in social relationships and
strong social support.” (Watson & Andrews 2002, 4)
27
“In psychiatry, emotions sufficient in duration and intensity are categorized as disorders irrespective of the situation. This encourages treatment without investigating
possible causes, on the assumption that anxiety and depression are abnormal” (Nesse &
Stein 2012, 4).
28
See Kennair (2003) for a similar idea: “... it may be important to consider these
different explanations as different taxonomic types of functional depression, rather than
as competing theories for all forms of depression” (694).
29
The problems are of two kinds. The first kind concerns the variation present at the
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moment of selection: “... we have no extant relatives which are suspected of sharing
similar selective regimes and that can therefore be used to test the fitness consequences
of the supposed adaptations. If all or most of the estimated dozen or so extinct hominid
species ... still existed, phylogenetic studies would certainly be easier, and might well
be useful for distinguishing between competing hypotheses about the spread and maintenance of phenotypic traits of interest. Unfortunately for testing adaptive hypotheses
in humans, all the other hominids are extinct, and so comparisions between the groups,
with special attention to the fitness consequences of differences in key traits, are impossible. The second one has to do with the selective regimes: “... we do not know where
(in the world) the various key evolutionary innovations that led to Homo Sapiens took
place nor when these innovations took place; given this, even if we knew what the environment was like at each place and in each time (which we don’t), we still would not
have sufficient information to use the comparative method” (Kaplan 2002, 297)
30
If “those hen-pecked animals [Hamadryas baboons and long-tailed macaques] could
talk and were allowed access, they would be queuing up at the Emergency Clinic to
complain of anxiety, depression and widespread aches and pains” (2002, 532; quoted by
Adriaens & De Block 2010)
31
Some, like Downes (2009), have argued that evolutionary psychology has exaggerated the importance of the Pleistocene as the period where human adaptations have
been shaped. As he claims, “... human behavior is a result of evolutionary processes
both much older and more recent than the Pleistocene” (244). If such is the case, the
prospects of evolutionary psychiatry are quite good.
32
We might think here of schizophrenia. Indeed, Crespi and colleagues have shown
that some of the genes that mediate the liability to schizophrenia have been selected in a
recent past. But when (it appears that they have not been selected at the same time) and
in response to which selective pressures were those traits selected, this is unknown and
it might well stay unknown as we might never have the relevant information to establish
it.
33
Nettle (2004) also notes that depression is not like pain. While there are individuals
who do not have pain (congenital anesthesia) and have reduced life expectancy, there is
a bunch of people who do not have depression and who do not suffer a reduction of their
life expectancy. Indeed, it is rather those who suffer from depression that have “impaired
psychosocial functioning, excess of mortality and poorer physical health than those who
do not ... ” (97)
34
As Allen & Badcock (2006) observe: “... although some recent studies have shown
that mild depressed states facilitate both social reasoning and performance on theory
of mind tasks, other studies using the same assessment procedures have found that in
clinical populations, these advantages are absent or even reversed” (822). So the jury is
still out on this.
35
Nesse (2009) explains the comorbidity in saying that the problems that trigger depression sometimes also demand greater vigilance and thus trigger also the threat systems (the question is thus, why do these two systems break so often together?).
36
Though it might not be a lesion, like Szasz wanted. Many advocates of evolutionary
psychiatry think that psychiatric problems can be like glitches in a program, that is,
something that you can’t see by looking at the hardware, but that affect the performance
of the computer (Wakefield 2007b).
37
It is possible to think of conflicts between different kinds of minds or variants of
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the mind arising from the fact that they do not have the same (adaptative) interests
or values (for instance, between reciprocal altruists and psychopaths, but also between
men and women, or between children and adults). The pursuit of these different values
or interests might lead sometimes to suffering, even if the root of the problem is not a
dysfunction. The evolutionary approach is well equipped to identify and understand the
sources of those conflicts that cause pain.
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